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I. INTRODUCTION
The nascent “pipeline wars” have supplanted the so-called war against coal.
Less than three months into the new administration, Environmental Protection
1
Agency (EPA) Administrator Scott Pruitt declared that “the war on coal is done.”
True. But it’s over because too many factors make steam coal unattractive in energy markets, not because traditional steam coal has an energy future. The decision
by many electric utilities to shutter their coal plants and shift instead toward natural gas and renewables counsels consideration of a new conflict. In February 2019,
New York University Law School’s Guarini Center hosted an event titled “Pipe-

* Centennial Distinguished Professor, Associate Dean, Co-Director, Center for Law & Energy Resources for the Rockies, University of Wyoming College of Law. The author would like to thank
KK DuVivier and Shi-Ling Hsu for their insights and helpful suggestions, as well as the editors of the
law review for all their work.
1. Benjamin Storrow, Coal, Once King in Texas, Sees Wind as “Real Competitor,” E&E NEWS
(Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2017/04/14/stories/1060053097; see also Kevin
Bogardus, Pruitt Touts End of “War on Coal”, E&E NEWS (May 2, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/
stories/1060053927.
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line Wars: The Battles Over Gas Infrastructure.” The Center observed that “almost every major pipeline project is now a legal battleground between the industry
3
and activist groups.” Indeed, as one news source reports:
[f]rom gas pipelines between Asia and Europe, to the web of infrastructure transporting high-carbon Alberta tar sands oil across North America,
to pipes crisscrossing the Niger Delta and traversing the southern highlands of Mexico, local communities, environmentalists, social justice activists and indigenous rights movements—and sometimes armed mili4
tants—have been fiercely resisting pipelines.
Protests against new pipeline infrastructure are so intense that the industry is wor5
ried about growing threats of vandalism.
Much is at stake. A sufficiently robust and reliable natural gas pipeline infrastructure could supply a new dominant fuel for the electric grid. And we may need
that supply. U.S. electric power consumption has remained fairly stable over the
past few years, partly due to increased energy efficiency. But our energy consumption has grown since 1950 and electric demand is likely to continue to grow
6
7
through 2050. This growth could be slow, at roughly 1% annually. Projections
suggest that natural gas consumption (for heating as well as electricity) could in8
crease between 18% and 40% from 2015 levels in that time. Natural gas, consequently, could reign as the dominant fuel through 2050 absent countervailing poli9
cies. While regions with highly interconnected pipeline systems are less

2. Paul Hartman et al., Symposium at the NYU School of Law Guarini Center on Environmental, Energy, and Land Use Law, Pipeline Wars: The Battles Over Gas Infrastructure Development
(Feb. 6, 2019), https://guarinicenter.org/feb-6-2019-pipelines-wars-the-battles-over-gas-pipelinedevelopment/.
3. Id. For oil pipelines, the Petroleum Economist similarly reports how, since Keystone XL,
“nearly every major pipeline project in the US is a battleground between the industry and activists looking to derail Big Oil.” Justin Jacobs, America’s Pipeline Wars, PETROLEUM ECON. (Nov. 7, 2016),
https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/midstream-downstream/pipelines/2016/americaspipeline-wars.
4. Stuart Braun, Pipeline Wars: Front Line in the Fight Against Climate Change, DW
(Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/pipeline-wars-front-line-in-the-fight-against-climate-change/
a-46334177.
5. See Mike Soraghan, Trump Plan to Jail Protesters: Justice or ‘Un-American’?, E&E NEWS (July
11, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/07/11/stories/1060722755.
6. ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., U.S. NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ASSESSMENT 12
(2018) [hereinafter EPRI]. We could experience a significant overall energy consumption decrease,
even though electricity use might increase. Some growth is projected to occur from increased penetration from EVs, as well as “[h]eat pumps for space and water heating, along with electric technologies in
industry and heavy transportation.” Id. at ES-7.
7.

EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2019: WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2050, at 90 (2019).

8.

EPRI, supra note 6, at 8.

9.

See infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
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vulnerable to supply disruptions, regions such as the northeast are less intercon10
nected and more susceptible to supply disruptions and power outages.
Pipeline infrastructure development parallels the rise in natural gas production. Global pipeline infrastructure growth has tripled since 1996, with much of
that growth occurring in North America and with a global average of 25 new pipe11
lines being built every year between 2009 and 2018. Some fear this bubble in in12
vestment, like with coal, could burst. “The world,” after all, “for which many
North American pipelines are being built may no longer exist by the time they are
13
completed.” Projects are highly leveraged and cost anywhere from $8 million to
upwards of $15 million per mile—with the Mountain Valley Pipeline projected to
14
cost over $5 billion. These projects may need at least a potentially unworkable 30
15
plus-year period for a sufficient capital repayment and return on investment. Indeed, the same is true for export facilities for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) development—we could be facing yet another stranded asset accompanying old coal16
fired power plants if we continue to construct new LNG facilities. One report
suggests “the scale of the LNG expansion under development is as large or greater

10. See NORTH AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., SPECIAL RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT:
POTENTIAL BULK POWER SYSTEM IMPACTS DUE TO SEVERE DISRUPTIONS ON THE NATURAL GAS
SYSTEM viii (2017). According to NERC, “many areas in North America could incur power flow and
stability issues if they were to experience significant losses of natural gas infrastructure. This accentuates the need for system operators and planners to conduct their own system studies around loss of
pipeline infrastructure and to develop contingency plans.” Id. at 27.
11. TED NACE, LYDIA PLANTE & JAMES BROWNING, PIPELINE BUBBLE: NORTH AMERICA IS
BETTING OVER $1 TRILLION ON A RISKY FOSSIL INFRASTRUCTURE BOOM 4 (2019),
https://globalenergymonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/GFITPipelineBubble_2019_v6.pdf.
12. Id. at 3; see also Carlos Anchondo, Natural Gas Facing Same Fate as Coal, E&E NEWS (Sept.
10, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061111699 (describing Rocky Mountain Institute study).
13. NACE, PLANTE & BROWNING, supra note 11, at 13. GE, for instance, announced closing a
natural gas plant years early as a consequence of the shift toward renewables. David Ferris, GE Shutters
Gas Plant Decades Early As Renewables Surge, E&E NEWS (June 25, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/
stories/1060652109.
14. Niina H. Farah, Mountain Valley Costs Spike After FERC Order, E&E NEWS (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/10/23/stories/1061349975.
15. NACE, PLANTE & BROWNING, supra note 11, at 13. Depreciation may track the economic
life of a project, while the physical or average service life might be different. FERC might assume a 35year natural gas supply, while the latest Energy Information Administration only predicts out to 2050
(a 30-year period), and yet in some proceedings FERC examines need over a 20-year period. Spire STL
Pipeline LLC, 164 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2018). The IRS uses different classes of infrastructure and accompanying periods for depreciation, and the Commission requires asset accounting reporting. 18 C.F.R. §
201 (2012).
16. TED NACE, LYDIA PLANTE & JAMES BROWNING, THE NEW GAS BOOM: TRACKING
GLOBAL LNG INFRASTRUCTURE 3 (2019), https://globalenergymonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/06/NewGasBoomEmbargo.pdf. One report describing shuttering a coal plant roughly 20 years too
early (economically) suggests ratepayers might be shouldered with $1 billion in costs over those two
decades. Jeffrey Tomich, ‘Stranded Costs’ Mount as Coal Vanishes from the Grid, E&E NEWS (May 29,
2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060419079.
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than the expansion of coal-fired power plants, posing a direct challenge to Paris
17
climate goals.”
Yet, as the nation builds out its natural gas infrastructure, will this shift to18
ward natural gas be as a bridge fuel, or something more? Even the notion of a
“bridge fuel” is problematic, however. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change warns that CO2 emissions must crest by 2030 and fall to a net zero by 2050
o
19
if we hope to limit global climate warming to 1.5 C by the close of the century.
Achievement of this goal is almost certain to require long-term reduction in natural
gas usage, although the need to eliminate natural gas may be mitigated somewhat
by the development of carbon capture and sequestration technology. To limit temo
perature increases to 1.5 C requires that emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) will
need to decline between 40% and 60% below 2010 levels by 2030 and then reach a
20
net negative by 2050. When, for instance, the House Energy and Commerce
Committee held a hearing in July 2019 on decarbonizing the economy by 2050—
21
the widely shared objective—no unanimity surfaced for natural gas’ future role.
Many believe we will need changes in the transportation sector, renewables, energy
efficiency, and new advancements in nuclear energy, and most likely some path22
ways for carbon capture and removal. A Union of Concerned Scientists’ witness
testified how “deep cuts” in methane emissions will be “necessary,” and likely include retaining natural gas but with accompanying carbon capture and sequestra23
tion (CCS). A utility industry representative testified that “fossil fuels must be
17.

NACE, PLANTE & BROWNING, supra note 16, at 3.

18. A gas trade association affiliated study posits that gas is a destination not a bridge fuel. See
Jenny Mandel, Natural Gas Is a Destination Fuel, Not a Bridge—Study, E&E NEWS (May 8, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/05/08/stories/1060292999.
19. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT ON GLOBAL
WARMING OF 1.5OC at 95 (Oct. 2018); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS OF IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5OC at 13-14
(Oct. 8, 2018) [hereinafter SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS]. If we cannot achieve this goal, reductions
in net emissions must occur to limit warming.
20.

SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 19, at 12.

21. See Sean Reilly, Hearing Starts Dems’ March Toward ‘Net-Zero’ Emissions, E&E NEWS (July
25, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060784811.
22. See HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, CHAIRMAN FRANK PALLONE, JR.,
MEMORANDUM: HEARING ON “BUILDING AMERICA’S CLEAN FUTURE: PATHWAYS TO
DECARBONIZE THE ECONOMY” (July 22, 2019), https://energycommerce.house.gov/
sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/072419%20Briefing%20Memo_ECC%20
Hearing_2019.07.24_Deep%20Decarbonization.pdf.
23. Creating a Climate Resilient America: Hearing Before the House Select Committee on the Climate
Crisis, 116th Cong. 1, 5 (2019) (Statement of Dr. Rachel Cleetus, Policy Director, Climate and Energy
Program, Union of Concerned Scientists). Dr. Cleetus added that “[n]atural gas with CCS could be a
contributor to a net-zero world.” See Reilly, supra note 21. Deep decarbonization may require some form
of carbon capture, and institutional mechanisms capable of allowing it to move forward. See Wendy B.
Jacobs & Michael Craig, Legal Pathways to Widespread Carbon Capture and Sequestration, 47 ENVTL. L.
REP. 11022 (2017). “CCS refers to the process of capturing, compressing, transporting, and then injecting compressed CO2 into underground geologic formations for storage.” Tara K. Righetti, Correlative
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accompanied by robust innovation in carbon capture, utilization and storage in the
24
production and use of fossil fuels.” Former Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz’s Energy Futures Initiative cautions that continued use of natural gas will require car25
bon capture, utilization, and storage. A senior fellow at the World Resources Institute similarly observed that, “regardless of whether one believes that CCS
technology will be needed for electricity generation, the technology is very likely
to be needed for the job of carbon dioxide removal,” as well as for reducing emis26
27
sions from the industrial sector. Of course, not all agree. And still others posit
that carbon capture must be accompanied by negative emission technologies and
direct air capture (DAC). A Rhodium Group analysis champions DAC and further
suggests that the United States “is well-positioned to foster development of DAC
28
with sequestration.” Consequently, a deeply decarbonized future will require either effective carbon capture and storage capacity for natural gas plants, as the
Rhodium Group and others advocate, or removing natural gas as a fuel source by
roughly 2030.
This article chronicles how natural gas has replaced coal as today’s energy dilemma. The pipeline wars illustrate landowners’ concern with special treatment for
industry seeking to condemn lands, while some states and the public object to the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC or Commission) approach to
approving new pipeline projects, or the Commission’s assessment of GHG emissions associated with project development.
Rights and Limited Common Property in the Pore Space: A Response to the Challenge of Subsurface Trespass in
Carbon Capture and Sequestration, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10420, 10422 (2017).
24. “Building America’s Clean Energy Future: Pathways to Decarbonize the Economy:” Hearing Before
the House Subcommittee on Environment and Climate Change, 116th Cong. 2 (2019) (Statement of Shannon Angielski, Executive Director, Carbon Utilization Research Council). A noted demonstration plant
would be Net Power’s La Porte, Texas project. See, e.g., James Conca, Net Zero Natural Gas Plant—The
Game Changer, FORBES (July 31, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2019/07/31/net-zeronatural-gas-plant-the-game-changer/. CCS can be employed to capture methane during the production
process as well. See, e.g., Carbon Capture and Storage, https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/
environment-and-technology/carbon-capture-and-storage/ (Jan 27, 2020) (Norwegian CCS activity).
25. ENERGY FUTURES INITIATIVE, THE GREEN REAL DEAL: A FRAMEWORK FOR
ACHIEVING A DEEPLY DECARBONIZED ECONOMY 25 (Aug. 2019).
26.
“Building America’s Clean Energy Future: Pathways to Decarbonize the Economy:” Hearing Before
the House Subcommittee on Environment and Climate Change, 116th Cong. 2, 3 (2019) (Statement of Dr.
Karl Hausk, World Resources Institute).
27. An upcoming analysis suggests natural gas is not a bridge fuel and we ought to avoid coupling it with CCS. Mark Z. Jacobson, Evaluation of Coal and Natural Gas With Carbon Capture as Proposed Solutions to Global Warming, Air Pollution, and Energy Security, in 100% CLEAN, RENEWABLE
ENERGY STORAGE FOR EVERYTHING (Cambridge U. Press forthcoming), available at
https://web.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/I/NatGasVsWWS&coal.pdf.
28. RHODIUM GRP., CAPTURING LEADERSHIP: POLICIES FOR THE US TO ADVANCE DIRECT
AIR CAPTURE TECHNOLOGY 7 (May 2019). DAC is one form of carbon capture technology, and it
requires binding the CO2 with a bonding agent and then separating out a pure stream of CO2. See generally Tracy Hester, Legal Pathways to Negative Emission Technologies and Direct Air Capture of Greenhouse
Gases, 48 ENVTL. L. REP. 10413 (2018).
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Part II examines the pipeline wars in their historical context, portraying the
rise of natural gas regulation, its increasing dominance as a fuel source, its associated environmental consequences, and the marked differences in how the Obama and
Trump administrations have treated natural gas. Part III describes and analyzes
three principal matters collectively displaying the challenges confronting the industry: (1) the Commission’s approach toward conditionally approving pipelines
before states can ensure construction activities will comply with the Clean Water
Act (CWA); (2) the Commission’s willingness to allow pipeline condemnation
proceedings to occur before landowners have an opportunity to thoroughly air
their concerns; and (3) FERC’s unwillingness to examine the indirect upstream
and downstream effects from increased GHG emissions associated with approving
a pipeline. This Part also discusses FERC’s 2018 Notice of Inquiry, soliciting input
on the Commission’s pipeline policies. Next, Part IV addresses the principal, looming questions in the pipeline wars: whether and how the Commission ought to
reexamine the need for new natural gas pipeline infrastructure. Major energy transitions present major challenges, and the resultant follies from these efforts
29
abound. If we fail to avoid yet another folly, our new natural gas infrastructure
could become either a shackle, impeding a zero-carbon energy future, or a bridge to
nowhere.

II. MOVING METHANE
A. Sputtering Natural Gas Regulation
Modern natural gas regulation is a product of tortured, disjointed—and some
30
may say flailing—efforts. Early in the twentieth century, natural gas escaped into
31
the atmosphere as an unwanted byproduct of oil production. The markets and
32
technology for capturing and transporting that gas had not yet surfaced, leaving
33
oil producers with little incentive to fret about the escaping gas. State rate and

29. See generally ROBERT R. NORDHAUS & SAM KALEN, ENERGY FOLLIES: MISSTEPS,
FIASCOS, AND SUCCESS OF AMERICA’S ENERGY POLICY (2018) (passim).
30.

See generally id.

31.

See ARLON R. TUSSING & BOB TIPPEE, THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: EVOLUTION,
STRUCTURE, AND ECONOMICS 79-80 (2d ed. 1995).
32. As one producer averred, “no machinery or process of any kind has ever by the highest skill
been devised or known to the world whereby in such a case the oil in such well can be produced and
saved, unless at the same time such natural gas as may be in such well is suffered to escape.” Ohio Oil
Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 199 (1900).
33. TUSSING & TIPPEE, supra note 31, at 80. The common law rule of capture, allowing a surface owner to access reserves even when those reserves underlie adjacent property, eventually contributed toward the pressure to develop technology for “long-distance pipelines.” Id. at 81.
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conservation regulation emerged early in the twentieth century, but a regulatory
gap surfaced quickly after the Supreme Court held that states lacked the authority
35
to regulate rates for interstate transportation.
Congress responded with the 1938 Natural Gas Act (NGA), establishing the
36
original contours for federal regulation of natural gas in interstate markets. Congress decided to regulate the growing natural gas industry under a public utility
37
model. As Justice Douglas explained, “the ‘basic purpose’ of this legislation was
‘to occupy’ the field . . . [in an area where the Court] had held the States might not
38
act.”
The NGA delegated to the Federal Power Commission (FPC, now FERC)
the authority to establish “just and reasonable” rates for interstate transportation
39
and interstate sales for resale of natural gas. The NGA also gave the FPC power
to grant certificates authorizing the sale of natural gas in interstate commerce, the
transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, and the construction and op40
eration of facilities for such sale and transportation. Regulated companies cannot
cease operating such facilities or terminate certificated transportation and sales un41
less granted abandonment by the Commission. Retail sales for ultimate public

34. The Supreme Court rejected claims that state conservation programs denied owners of their
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights (e.g., taking of their property). Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana,
177 U.S. 190, 212 (1900). The Court’s judgment, however, flowed from its application of the rule of
capture: “[t]he proposition, then, which denies the power in the state to regulate by law the manner in
which the gas and oil may be appropriated, and thus prevent their destruction, of necessity involves the
assertion that there can be no right of ownership in and to the oil and gas before the same have been
actually appropriated by being brought into the possession of some particular person.” Id. at 201.
35. In Missouri v. Kan. Nat. Gas, 265 U.S. 298 (1924), the Court held that states lacked regulatory authority over the rates charged by interstate pipelines, precipitating the need for Congress to fill a
regulatory gap. That gap later became significant once the Federal Trade Commission issued a scathing
roughly 600 page report chronicling the gas industry’s monopolistic practices—and encouraging congressional action. See Richard J. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural
Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345, 345 (1983). For a concise history of the NGA, see Donald J.
Libert, Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Act, 44 GEO. L.J. 695 (1956).
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z, Pub. L. No. 75-688, 52 Stat. 821 (1938); see also Pub. L. No. 83-323,
68 Stat. 36 (1954) (amending NGA to allow states to regulate as a matter of local concern interstate
activity if the gas is consumed in the origin state).
37. The public utility model affords the industry a monopoly franchise covering a particular
territory in return for acceding to rate regulation and an obligation to serve those in the franchise territory. Common carrier obligations, however, originally attended pipeline rights-of-way under the Mineral Leasing Act, but Congress extinguished that obligation in 1953. Pub. L. No. 253, 67 Stat. 557
(1953).
38. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 609-10 (1944) (citing H. REP. No.
709, 75th Cong., at 2 (1937)).
39.

15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (2018).

40. The NGA confers jurisdiction on the FPC to regulate, inter alia, “the sale in interstate
commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2018).
41.

Natural Gas Act § 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (2018).
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consumption, and “production and gathering,” were specifically exempted from the
42
Commission’s jurisdiction.
In June 1954, the Supreme Court infamously interpreted the NGA as tasking
the FPC with the authority and obligation to regulate natural gas producers’
43
wholesale sales of natural gas in interstate commerce. This set in motion a chain
of events that propelled the FPC on a path of natural gas producer regulation with
unforeseen and extraordinarily disruptive consequences for the natural gas industry, the economies of gas-consuming states, and ultimately for U.S. energy securi44
ty. It triggered interstate natural gas shortages, impractical FPC gas “curtail45
ment” (i.e., shortage management) policies, and eventually congressional
46
intervention with the passage in 1978 of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA).
President Carter announced that the NGPA would “give us a new national market,
making available new supplies of natural gas, which will be at a lower price than
47
competitive foreign oil.” While the NGPA ostensibly resolved interstate natural
gas shortages, by the end of the decade the country was finally enjoying a natural
48
gas surplus. The Act removed disincentives to sell gas into the interstate market,
49
and interstate pipelines replenished their depleted gas supplies. But gas once
50
again became less economical by 1986, as oil prices declined considerably. Congress shortly thereafter passed the Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989 to remove
51
some of the remnants of producer price controls not lifted in the NGPA.

42. Natural Gas Act §§ 1(b), 4, 5, 7; 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2018); e.g., ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. Co.
v. FERC, 297 F.3d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (upholding FERC’s approach toward offshore gathering
lines).
43.

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).

44. See NORDHAUS & KALEN, supra note 29, at ch. 5. The factors surrounding the Phillips decision are fascinating, and those who defended the decision, such as one of Illinois’ senators, championed
the need to protect residential natural gas consumers against excessive rates. See Hon. Paul H. Douglas,
The Case for the Consumer of Natural Gas, 44 GEO. L.J. 566, 575 (1956).
45. See generally Stephen Breyer & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas Producers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 941 (1973). Producer representatives warned in the
1950s that producers would opt to sell gas locally rather than into the regulated interstate market. See
Rayburn L. Foster, Natural-Gas Regulation from the Producers’ Standpoint, 44 GEO. L.J. 658, 672-75
(1956). Interstate pipelines consequently would need to spread their fixed costs across fewer sources—
forcing increased costs to those customers. Id. at 672-73.
46. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351 (1978). See generally Robert R. Nordhaus, Producer Regulation and the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 19 NAT. RES. J. 4 (1979).
47. Natural Gas Legislation, 14 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1452 (Aug. 18, 1978) (remarking on
the conference committees’ reports on the NGPA).
48. See J.P. Smith, Natural Gas Glut: Experts Agree that Outlook Has Changed Dramatically,
WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1978, A1.
49.

See NORDHAUS & KALEN, supra note 29, at 90-92.

50. Paul L. Joskow, Natural Gas: From Shortages to Abundance in the United States, 103 AMER.
ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 338, 339 (2013).
51. Pub. L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157 (1989). Existing NGPA “controls misdirect[ed] scare exploration capital by setting artificially high and low ‘ceiling prices’ that still cover[ed] about one-third of
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This turmoil subsided somewhat as FERC began restructuring the industry.
As Judge Stephen Williams, a prominent energy jurist, would later write, “[i]n the
Spring of 1985, as Mikhail Gorbachev was assuming the duties of General Secretary and inaugurating perestroika, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
52
launched its own restructuring of the natural gas industry.” The Commission began issuing orders affording interstate pipelines broad, flexible authority to provide
various types of transportation services, on the condition the companies would of53
fer those services on a nondiscriminatory, open access basis. As part of this industry restructuring, FERC forced the unbundling of services, with only a limited
ability for pipelines to market their own gas; and the Commission provided for
blanket pipelines sales certificates, with pre-granted authority for abandonment, a
capacity reallocation mechanism, a comparability standard, a confirmation of
54
straight fixed variable rate design, along with transition cost recovery. This effectively transformed the natural gas industry from one where pipelines bought natural gas and then resold it in a bundled transaction that included both gas acquisition costs and pipeline transportation, to a regime where pipelines were primarily
transporters of gas produced and sold entirely outside the ambit of price regulation. This transformation resulted in pipeline companies transporting only 21% of
55
their own gas in 1992, down from about 92% in 1984.
Congress facilitated the gas industry’s transition by including several gasrelated provisions in omnibus energy bills, beginning with the Energy Policy Act
56
of 1992. For example, it relieved independent producers from the Alternative
57
Minimum Tax. It also notably sought to promote unconventional gas development, and it implicitly boosted natural gas in a title on Global Climate Change
when it called for developing a least-cost and reduced greenhouse gas energy strat58
egy. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 included additional carrots for the industry,
such as streamlining provisions and allowing companies to provide storage at market based rates, while also directing price transparency and strengthening rules
our nation’s total gas supplies,” producing “[d]istorted overinvestment in low-flowing but artificially
high-priced wells, and underinvestment in more prolific but artificially low-priced wells.” Natural Gas
Decontrol Act of 1989, Rep. 101-29, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 2 (1989).
52.

Am. Gas Ass’n v. FERC, 912 F.2d 1496, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

53.

NORDHAUS & KALEN, supra note 29, at 93-94.

54. Id. at 94; see also Donald F. Santa, Jr. & Clifford Sikora, Open Access and Transition Costs:
Will the Electric Industry Transition Track the Natural Gas Industry Restructuring, 15 ENERGY L.J. 273
(1994).
55. Don Santa & Patricia Beneke, Federal Natural Gas Policy and the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 14
ENERGY L.J. 1, 7 (1993).
56.

See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).

57.

Id. § 1915.

58. See id. §§ 201-02. In Title II, Congress removed barriers to imports and exports of natural
gas with countries with Free Trade Agreements, 106 Stat. 2866, and declared the sense of Congress
“that natural gas consumers and producers, and the national economy, are best served by a competitive
natural gas wellhead market,” and in Title XVI it addressed global climate change. 106 Stat. 2999.
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59

against market manipulation. During this time, industrial, residential, and overall
natural gas usage increased annually and eventually surpassed coal as the nation’s
60
primary source of energy production.
Today, a proposal for an interstate natural gas pipeline must demonstrate to
FERC that the line serves the public interest to merit a Certificate of Public Con61
venience and Necessity (§ 7 Certificate). If a pipeline serves the public convenience and necessity, the NGA directs the Commission to issue a certificate—
62
possibly with conditions. The Commission accepts pre-construction contract
commitments (precedent agreements), with shippers committing to use a set percentage of the pipeline’s capacity to demonstrate a market need for the natural
63
gas. These commitments generally occur during what is called an open season,
when the pipeline advertises its project and solicits from prospective shippers a
commitment to use a percentage of the pipeline’s capacity. Once shippers commit
64
to enough capacity, companies typically apply for a blanket certificate. This gen-

59. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594, 688 (2005). In Order Nos.
678 and 678-A, the Commission adopted market-based rates for storage. Order 678, Rate Regulation of
Certain Natural Gas Storage Facilities (June 19, 2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284); Order on
Clarification and Rehearing 678-A, Rate Regulation of Certain Natural Gas Storage Facilities (Nov. 16,
2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284).
60. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW AUGUST 2017, at 4, 6
(2017). The 1990s’ gas restructuring likely contributed toward the status we presumably now enjoy with
our present shale gas revolution and seeming natural gas abundance. It sent clear market signals to producers and afforded incentives for cost-effective new technologies—including more efficient combined
cycle gas turbines capable of serving as baseload resources.
61.

15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (2018).

62. Id. FERC typically phrases its obligation as mandatory if it concludes that a project serves
the public convenience and necessity, while courts occasionally note the “Commission may issue a certificate” if it so finds. E.g., Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty. v. FERC, 783 F.3d 1301, 1307 (D.C.
Cir. 2015).
63. See Appalachian Voices v. FERC, No. 17-1271, 2019 WL 847199, at *1 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 19,
2019) (allowing a precedent agreement with an affiliated entity); Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1359,
1379 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Precedent agreements are temporary, replaced later by Firm Transportation
Service Agreements. FERC may reject terms in a precedent agreement before being approved. See
Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, at paras. 97-106 (2017); Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 97 FERC ¶ 61,221 (2001) (discussing non-conforming provisions); see also infra notes 255-62
(discussing precedent agreements).
64.

18 C.F.R. Parts 157.204 (2018). As FERC explains:

[u]nder a blanket certificate issued pursuant to section 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act, a natural
gas company may undertake a restricted array of routine activities without the need to obtain a case-specific certificate for each individual project. The blanket certificate program
provides an administratively efficient means to enable a company to construct, modify, acquire, operate, and abandon a limited set of natural gas facilities, and offer a limited set of
services, provided each activity complies with constraints on costs and environmental impacts set forth in the Commission’s regulations.”
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Blanket Certificates, INDUSTRIES, https://www.ferc.gov/
industries/gas/indus-act/blank-cert.asp (as of March 19, 2019).
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erally occurs only after the company engages in extensive pre-filing outreach with
65
interested stakeholders and permitting authorities. A general certificate condition
requires documentation of receipt of all applicable federal environmental authori66
zations before proceeding with construction. Once the Commission issues a § 7
certificate, § 7(h) entitles the certificate holder to acquire the necessary property
interests for constructing the approved facilities, including by exercising eminent
67
domain authority.
The regulatory authority over exports and imports of natural gas is split between FERC and the Secretary of Energy. Section 3 of the original NGA delegated authority over both imports and exports of natural gas, or correspondingly liq68
uefied natural gas, to the FPC. Congress instructed the Commission to allow an
import or export, “unless, after opportunity for hearing, it finds that the proposed
69
exportation or importation will not be consistent with the public interest.” When
65. See Robert Christin et al., Considering the Public Convenience and Necessity in Pipeline Certificate Cases Under the Natural Gas Act, 38 ENERGY L.J. 115, 131 (2017).
66. E.g., Spire STL Pipeline L.L.C., 164 FERC 61,085 at App. para. 9 (Aug. 3, 2018) (requiring compliance with environmental conditions, “Spire must receive written authorization from the Director of OEP before commencing construction of any project facilities. To obtain such authorization, Spire
must file with the Secretary documentation that it has received all applicable authorizations required
under federal law (or evidence of waiver thereof)”); see also Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., 169 FERC ¶
61,051 at 41, App. B (2019) (requiring compliance with environmental conditions outlined in Appendix
B).
67.

The company can choose to file a proceeding in either state or federal court:

When any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property to the compensation to be paid for,
the necessary right-of-way to construct, operate, and maintain a pipe line or pipe lines for
the transportation of natural gas, and the necessary land or other property, in addition to
right-of-way, for the location of compressor stations, pressure apparatus, or other stations or
equipment necessary to the proper operation of such pipe line or pipe lines, it may acquire
the same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of the United
States for the district in which such property may be located, or in the State courts. The
practice and procedure in any action or proceeding for that purpose in the district court of
the United States shall conform as nearly as may be with the practice and procedure in similar action or proceeding in the courts of the State where the property is situated: Provided,
That the United States district courts shall only have jurisdiction of cases when the amount
claimed by the owner of the property to be condemned exceeds $3,000.
15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2018). Congress, consistent with the Commission’s recommendation, added this
provision in 1947. Pub. L. No. 80-245, 61 Stat. 459 (1947). Congress noted that it granted eminent domain authority to hydroelectric facilities and neglected including a similar provision in the NGA. This
then became problematic in states where pipelines could not use condemnation authority. Amendments
to the Natural Gas Act: Hearings on S. 734 and S. 1028 before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 11 (Apr. 29, July 1, 1947).
68.

15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2018), Pub. L. No. 688, 52 Stat. 821, 822 (1938).

69. Id. Also, “[t]he Commission” was granted authority to “grant such application, in whole or
in part, with such modification and upon such terms and conditions as the Commission may find necessary or appropriate.” Id. Federal authority over imports in § 3 flows from the Foreign Commerce
Clause. See Distrigas Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 495 F.2d 1057, 1062-63 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Border
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Congress passed the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977 and established FERC (replacing the FPC), it transferred § 3 authority to the newly established Secretary of Energy, “unless the Secretary assigns such a function to the
70
Commission.” The discussion then surrounding LNG focused on issues sur71
rounding imports. In the 2005 Energy Policy Act, Congress ensured that FERC
would exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the siting, construction, expansion, and
operation of LNG export and import facilities. Congress incorporated specific provisions designed to streamline the permitting and environmental review processes
72
for such facilities. Congress also directed the Commission to promulgate regulations for complying with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and to
ensure that interested stakeholders would be involved in a pre-filing process for
73
any proposed LNG facility. The Commission responded with rules designed to
74
encourage additional natural gas infrastructure, including LNG terminals.

B. Methane: The Good, The Bad, The Ugly
Several years ago, Exelon’s CEO John Rowe acknowledged the dethroning of
King Coal, as he and other utility CEO’s effectively anointed gas as a new bridge
75
fuel to a cleaner energy economy. The shale revolution, after all, fundamentally
altered the energy landscape. The combination of hydraulic fracking and horizontal
76
drilling catapulted natural gas to an abundant resource in the U.S. On the production side, however, contamination from fracking quickly surfaced as an initial

Pipeline Line Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 171 F.2d 149, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1948). For a discussion of the
line between § 3 and § 7 authority, see Sound Energy Solutions, 107 FERC ¶ 61,263 (2004).
70.

Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565, 585 (1977).

71. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: AN EVALUATION OF THE
NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN 4.26 (1977). The General Accounting Office believed that Carter’s plan under-estimated future natural gas demand, and thus over-estimated the likely amount of LNG imports.
Id. at 427.
72. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594, 685-86 (2005). While Congress vested the Commission
with exclusive jurisdiction over the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of LNG facilities, it
added a caveat that “nothing in this Act is intended to affect otherwise applicable law related to any
Federal agency’s authorities or responsibilities related to LNG terminals.” Id.
73. Id. at 689. Congress focused particularly on ensuring that state and local authorities would
be consulted on matters involving state and local safety. Id. at 687.
74. FERC, FACT SHEET: ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005, at 4 (2006),
https://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/epact-fact-sheet.pdf. For a treatment of LNG issues during the period immediately prior to and after the 2005 Act, see Shelia Slocum Holis, Liquefied Natural Gas: “The Big
Picture” for Future Development in North America, 2 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 5 (2007).
75. Utility CEO Support EPA’s New Air-Quality Standards, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 8, 2011),
https://thinkprogress.org/utility-ceo-support-epas-new-air-quality-standards-9409c7973859/.
76. Richard J. Pierce, Natural Gas Fracking Addresses All Our Major Problems, 4 ENERGY &
ENVTL. L. 22 (2013).
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77

cause célèbre. Yet, regardless of contamination concerns and the likelihood of increased earthquakes in certain regions, natural gas’ abundance, low cost, diminished
health risks when compared with coal, and its reduced long-term potency as a
GHG made it an attractive fuel source. The years prior to the shale revolution,
78
when writers predicted a high noon for natural gas, morphed into conversations
79
about gas powering the globe.
Natural gas undoubtedly is cleaner than coal, but it too comes at a cost. Natu80
ral gas is primarily methane—ranging between 70% to 98% by volume. By late
2017, “the global mean methane concentration was nearly triple that of preindustrial times,” having risen dramatically during the 1900s—and while leveling off
81
somewhat recently has experienced another rise since the shale gas boom. Atmos82
pheric anthropogenic methane originates from a variety of sources, such as cows,
83
84
melting permafrost, and landfills. And while EPA’s GHG inventory reports

77. See generally Bryan Walsh, The Gas Dilemma, TIME, at 41, 42 (Apr, 11, 2011); see also Tala
Hadavi, How Fracking Changed America Forever, CNBC (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/
2020/01/06/the-impact-of-fracking-on-us-consumers-and-local-communities.html; Pamela King, A Decade of Fracking Research: What Have We Learned?, E&E NEWS (July 11, 2018),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060087955 (summary exposé of the history); Mike Lee, How a Death
in Texas Shaped Gas-Boom Regulation, E&E NEWS, July 5, 2018 (additional summary).
78.
(2004).
79.

E.g., JULIAN DARLEY, HIGH NOON FOR NATURAL GAS: THE NEW ENERGY CRISIS
See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 76, at 6-7; Walsh, supra note 77.

80.

NORMAN J. HYNE, NONTECHNICAL GUIDE TO PETROLEUM GEOLOGY, EXPLORATION
DRILLING & PRODUCTION 10 (2d ed. 2001).
81. A CONSENSUS STUDY REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES,
IMPROVING CHARACTERIZATION OF ANTHROPOGENIC METHANE EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1-2 (2018).
82. See Daniel Cusick, For Climate-Smart Farmers, Carbon Solution is in the Soil, E&E NEWS (July 1, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060681577 (noting that livestock production accounts for
roughly 40% of agriculture’s contribution toward emissions); cf. Jeremy P. Jacobs, Cow Manure: An Unexpected Climate Solution, E&E NEWS (May 21, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/
stories/1060367345.
83. Merritt R. Turetsky et al., Permafrost Collapse is Accelerating Carbon Release, 569 NATURE 32
(Apr. 30, 2019); Katey Walter Anthony et al., 21st-Century Modeled Permafrost Carbon Emissions Accelerated by Abrupt Thaw Beneath Lakes, 2 NATURE COMM. 3262 (2018).
84. See generally Ellen M. Gilmer, Court Orders Agency to Address Landfill Emissions, E&E NEWS
(May 7, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060286903; Nina Heikkinen, White House Sped Review
of Methane Rule Delay, E&E NEWS (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060104929 (discussing landfills).
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85

that methane releases have broadly decreased since 1990, it appears that since
86
2006, methane releases are rising.
Methane reduction presents an opportunity for arresting rising GHG emissions before 2050. It is, as Professor Steven Ferrey notes, “the second most perni87
cious warming chemical after CO2.” As the National Academy of Science observes, “[e]ven though” methane “has much lower atmospheric abundance than
carbon dioxide,” it absorbs 20 to 25 times more energy per unit mass than carbon
88
dioxide does. Its relatively short life-span—some estimates range between 12 and
less than 10 years—provides a unique opportunity for reducing present atmospher89
ic GHGs. Although scientists dispute the actual amount of emissions during oil
90
and gas production, the National Academy suggests that approximately 25% of
U.S. methane emissions are from natural gas systems—excluding even the end use
91
of the gas.
Methane emissions also contribute toward other environmental and health
problems. Ground level ozone, for instance, forms when oxides of nitrogen react

85. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS 1990-2017 ES-8
(2019). EPA identified enteric fermentation from livestock, natural gas systems, and landfill gas as the
three principal sources. Id.; see also NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., IMPROVING CHARACTERIZATION OF
ANTHROPOGENIC METHANE EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2018) [hereinafter NAS] (using
2015 data: natural gas – 25%, petroleum – 6%, enteric fermentation – 25%, manure management – 10%,
rice cultivation – 2%, landfills – 18%, wastewater – 2%, coal mining – 10%).
86.

Id. at 1-2, 24.

87.

Seven Ferrey, The Second Element, First Priority, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 41, 43 (2018).

88. NAS, supra note 85, at 21. Although others believe the number is higher, EPA indicates that
methane is 25 times more potent over a 100-year period than CO2. EPA, GLOBAL NON-CO2
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION PROJECTIONS & MITIGATION: 2015-2050 at 4 (Sept. 2019). Steven
Ferrey posits that our assumption that CH4 is only 25 times more potent than CO2 considerably underestimates its potency. Ferrey, supra note 87, at 45-47.
89. NAS, supra note 85, at 21 (Reducing methane emissions could have outsized near-term climate change reduction impacts due to its disproportionately large greenhouse effect. But because methane doesn’t linger long in the atmosphere, its reduction has fewer long-term benefits.).
90. John Fialka, Researchers Say Methane Estimates at Gas Wells Were Wrong, E&E NEWS (May
16, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060341025 (describing a report on recent American methane
emissions by Xin Lan et. al., Long-Term Measurements Show Little Evidence for Large Increases in total U.S.
Methane Emissions Over the Past Decade, 46 GEO. RES. LETRS. 49991 (May 2019)). For a comprehensive
earlier study by World Resources Institute, see JAMES BRADBURY ET AL., CLEARING THE AIR:
REDUCING UPSTREAM GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM U.S. NATURAL GAS SYSTEMS (2013).
91. NAS, supra note 85, at 29, 52-60 (noting five principal aspects: well sites, gathering and
boosting stations, processing plans, transmission facilities, and petroleum production wells). Recent
studies suggest that local natural gas distribution systems are releasing more methane than previously
thought. See Sid Perkins, Major U.S. Cities Are Leaking Methane at Twice the Rate Previously Believed,
SCI., July 19, 2019 (discussing methane emissions from cities on the US East Coast). And other recent
studies suggest we are underestimating the overall level of methane emissions. Chris Mooney, Methane
is a Hard-Hitting Greenhouse Gas. Now Scientists Say We’ve Dramatically Underestimated How Much We’re
Emitting, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/
2020/02/19/were-vastly-undercounting-methane-emissions-fossil-fuels-scientists-say/.
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92

with volatile organic compounds—such as methane—in the presence of sunlight.
This affects air quality, particularly for sensitive populations, and it can adversely
93
affect a range of resources, such as forests, parks, and wildlife.

C. Diametrically Opposite Political Responses
Once it initiated efforts to reduce CO2 emissions from the transportation sector and electric utilities, the Obama Administration addressed methane emissions.
It set a goal to reduce emissions from the oil and gas sector 40-plus percent below
94
2012 levels by 2025. EPA exercised authority under the CAA to regulate me95
thane emissions from new sources in the oil and gas industry. The Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) followed with two regulations. The first targeted frack96
ing on public lands. The second was an exercise of BLM authority under the
92. See Ground-Level Ozone Pollution, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ground-level-ozonepollution/ground-level-ozone-basics#formation (last visited Mar. 30, 2020).
93. Western states in particular must address regional haze from fossil-fuel production and generation. Ground level ozone, for instance, “arrived in force more than a decade ago in [Wyoming’s] Jonah and Pinedale gas field.” Heather Richards, Dramatic Ozone Spikes Puzzle Regulators, Locals in Wyoming Gas Field, TRIBE (Mar. 22, 2019), https://trib.com/business/energy/dramatic-ozone-spikes-puzzleregulators-locals-in-wyoming-gas-field/article_82837053-a70d-5591-b4a4-e83c24e8565b.html.
West
Texas residents are impacted by emissions from the Permian Basin. See Paul Stinson, Permian Basin
Pollution Lacks Texas Monitoring, Report Claims, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (May 10, 2019),
https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/permian-basin-pollution-lackstexas-monitoring-report-claims; see also Mike Lee, Oil, Gas Emissions Linked to Health Problems-Study,
E&E NEWS (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061308063. EPA’s alleged failure to address the health effects from ozone-forming oil and gas industry emissions may trigger a lawsuit designed to tighten regulations. See Sean Reilly, Enviros Threaten to Sue EPA Over Oil and Gas Guidelines,
E&E NEWS (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061357769.
94. Dan Utech, Administration Takes Historic Action to Reduce Methane Emissions for the Oil and
Gas Sector, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 12, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
blog/2016/05/12/administration-takes-historic-action-reduce-methane-emission-oil-and-gas-sector. The
four key sectors identified for methane emissions were landfills, coal mines, agriculture, and oil and gas.
WHITE HOUSE, CLIMATE ACTION PLAN STRATEGY TO REDUCE METHANE (2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/strategy_to_reduce_methane_emissions_201403-28_final.pdf. For natural gas systems, the administration identified “15 percent from processing, 34
percent from transmission and storage, and 20 percent from distribution.” Id. The administration developed several programs for reducing emissions. See DOE, QUADRENNIAL ENERGY REVIEW:
ENERGY TRANSMISSION, STORAGE, AND DISTRIBUTION INFRASTRUCTURE S-26 (2015) [hereinafter
QER-1]; see also Avery Fellow, Clinton Announces International Coalition to Help Countries Cut Methane,
Black Carbon, E&E NEWS (Feb. 17, 2012), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1059960128.
95. Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35824
(June 3, 2016); see also Source Determination for Certain Emission Units in the Oil and Natural Gas
Sector, 81 Fed. Reg. 35622 (June 3, 2016).
96. Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 16128 (Mar. 26, 2015). A
district court enjoined the rule, Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 2016 WL 3509415 (D. Wyo. 2016),
and the Tenth Circuit dismissed an appeal as unripe, Wyoming v. Zinke, 871 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir.
2017), all by the time the Trump administration issued a rescission of the 2015 rule. Rescission of a 2015
Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 61,924 (Dec. 29, 2017) (rescission of 2015 rule).
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Mineral Leasing Act (MLA) and Federal Land Policy and Management Act
97
(FLPMA) to regulate methane venting and flaring on public lands, including the
over a billion cubic feet of natural gas being vented or flared in the Permian Basin
98
and Bakken shale formations alone. In 2018, expanding oil production in the
Bakken and Permian formations contributed to a 48% increase in flaring national99
ly. One estimate suggests that the industry emits roughly 13 million metric tons
100
of methane annually—in 2015, this was 60% more methane than EPA reported.
The National Academy of Sciences suggests, consequently, that the federal government must develop and implement better tools for measuring, inventorying,
101
and monitoring methane emissions.

97. Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation, 81 Fed.
Reg. 83,008 (Nov. 18, 2016); see generally Ellen M. Gilmer, Critics Hit Up 2 Courts to Block Obama Methane Standards, E&E NEWS (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2018/04/17/stories/
1060079245 (discussing challenges to these Obama-era regulations).
98. See Stephen Lee, States Ask Judge to Restore Obama-Era Natural Gas Waste Rule, BLOOMBERG
ENV’T (June 10, 2019), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/states-askjudge-to-restore-obama-era-natural-gas-waste-rule. According to the Wilderness Society, operators
wasted at least 462 billion cubic feet of gas during President Obama’s administration. WILDERNESS
SOC’Y, TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE, THE STATE OF METHANE (2018). For New Mexico, with
production almost doubling over the past several years, EDF reports about 1 million metric tons of
emissions during 2018, with about three-fourths from Permian Basin. Mike Lee, Methane Emissions
Double Previous Estimates—Study, E&E NEWS (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/
2019/04/12/stories/1060154699. Production growth in 2018 led to significant increases in flaring—to
levels not experienced for several years. See Mike Lee, Gas Glut Spurs Near-Record Flaring Across Shale
States, E&E NEWS (May 8, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060292021; see also Jenny Madel,
U.S. Flaring Spiked 48% Last Year – Study, E&E NEWS (June 14, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/
energywire/2019/06/14/stories/1060574675.
99. See Madel, supra note 98 (noting how one report suggests that more natural gas is “flared in
the Permian than is produced from the biggest offshore gas field in the Gulf of Mexico”); see also Carlos
Anchondo, Gas Flaring Record Spiked CO2 Emissions in 2019—Report, E&E NEWS (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1062265397.
100. Ramón A. Alvarez et al., Assessment of Methane Emissions from the U.S. Oil and Gas Supply
Chain, 36 SCIENCE 186 (2018); see also Chelsea Harvey, Methane From Oil and Gas Sharply Underestimated—Study, E&E NEWS (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2020/02/20/stories/
1062396511; Carlos Anchondo, Gas Flare Blips Are World’s Biggest Methane Source—Report, E&E NEWS
(Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061173321. For a report on venting and flaring with a
unique focus on offshore activities, see BUREAU OF SAFETY & ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT, VENTING AND
FLARING RESEARCH STUDY REPORT (Jan. 2017) (prepared by the Argonne Venting and Flaring Research Team).
101. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., IMPROVING CHARACTERIZATION OF ANTHROPOGENIC
METHANE EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2018). Some companies have worked with EDF and
agreed on measures to monitor and reduce methane emissions. See Jenny Mandel, Methane Questions
NEWS
(June
26,
2018),
Leak
to
the
Surface
as
Industry
Gathers,
E&E
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060020954; John Fialka, More Gas is Leaking Than Previously Estimated-Study, E&E NEWS (June 22, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060086093/.
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Unsurprisingly, the Trump Administration policies favor increased natural gas
102
production, transportation, and export. And they do so as more than just a
bridge fuel. Early in the Trump Administration, conversations by administration
officials, including the President, typically coalesced around coal and oil rather
103
than natural gas. Recapturing energy markets for coal became justified under the
energy dominance umbrella. The Clean Power Plan, consequently, gave way to the
104
proposed Affordable Clean Energy plan; the administration swiftly lifted the
105
Obama federal coal leasing moratorium; it began removing environmental re106
quirements for coal plants under the CWA; it revised the Clean Air Act’s New
Source Performance Standards to encourage investment in coal technologies other
107
than high cost carbon capture and storage. The administration even unsuccessfully explored whether the Energy Department could entice FERC into deploying
a relic provision in the Department of Energy Organization Act to promote coal

102. See, e.g., Jean Chemnick & Scott Waldman, Trump to Tout Natural Gas as Paris Climate
Deadline Looms, E&E NEWS (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1061350671;
Scott Waldman, Trump Outlines Environment Plan: More Fracking, E&E NEWS (Oct. 24, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2019/10/24/stories/1061359091.
103. See Tom Randall, The Cheap Energy Revolution is Here, and Coal Won’t Cut It, BLOOMBERG
ENV’T (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-26/the-cheap-energyrevolution-is-here-and-coal-won-t-cut-it.
104. 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019). Chairman Neil Chatterjee submitted comments on how
the proposed replacement of the Clean Power Plan, along with changes to the New Source Performance
Standards, were welcome changes. Letter from Office of the Chairman Neil Chatterjee, FERC, to Acting Administrator Wheeler, re: Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing
Electric Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations; Revisions to
New Source Review Program, Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-QAR-2017-0355, Oct. 31, 2018.
105. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3348, CONCERNING THE FEDERAL
COAL MORATORIUM (Mar. 29, 2017).
106. Brady Dennis, Trump Administration Halts Obama-Era Rule Aimed at Curbing Toxic
Wastewater from Coal Plants, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
energy-environment/wp/2017/04/13/trump-administration-halts-obama-era-rule-aimed-at-curbingtoxic-wastewater-from-coal-plants/. Administrator Pruitt reportedly commented that “[t]he coal industry was nearly devasted by years of regulatory overreach, [b]ut with new direction from President
Trump, we are helping to turn things around for these [coal] miners and for many other hard working
Americans.” Id.
107. 83 Fed. Reg. 65,424 (Dec. 20, 2018); News Release, EPA Proposes 111(b) Revisions to Advance Clean Energy Technology: Proposal Supports President Trump’s Energy Dominance Agenda,
EPA (Dec. 6, 2018), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/newsreleases/epa-proposes-111b-revisions-advanceclean-energy-technology.html (“The previous administration sought to discourage new coal developments by requiring the use of unproven carbon capture and storage technologies that turned out to be
economically prohibitive and limited geographically. By revising the NSPS, EPA will protect the environment while help to provide room for American energy production”). The administration, therefore,
appears unlikely to limit GHG emissions from natural gas-fired power plants. Amena H. Saiyid, EPA
Official Says No Need Now to Limit Carbon Dioxide at Gas Plants, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Dec. 3, 2019),
https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/epa-official-says-no-need-now-tolimit-carbon-dioxide-at-gas-plants.
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and nuclear energy, by suggesting that the natural gas pipeline system is too sus108
ceptible to cyberattacks.
But coal-fired electric generation can no longer compete with natural gas or
109
even renewable energy. With the Solar Investment Tax Credit assumed to expire, renewable generation capacity (primarily solar utility-scale and small-scale
110
PV) is nevertheless expected to grow the most through 2050. Since 2017, the
United States has been a net energy exporter due to abundant petroleum and gas
111
production and reduced domestic oil consumption. The Energy Information
Administration (EIA) expects this trend to continue through the next several dec112
ades. Marketed U.S. natural gas production has grown from 22.4 million cubic
113
feet in 2010 to 32.8 million in 2018, producing downward pressure on prices and
a feedback loop incentivizing further coal to gas switching. This is projected to lead
114
to “the largest production increase of all fossil fuels” through 2050. Shale gas
production has been growing rapidly and is expected to continue over the next 20
115
years, precipitating the need for increased pipeline capacity. When Bloomberg
News reported in April 2019 on Chevron’s acquisition of Anadarko, it couched its
116
piece as evidence that big oil ostensibly was transitioning to big gas. In 2018,
natural gas usage by electric utilities surpassed coal as the dominant fuel, with the
industry producing 35% of electric power from gas, 27% from coal, 19% from nu108. See Blake Sobczak & Peter Behr, Pipeline Fears Anchor Trump’s Coal, Nuclear Bailout, E&E
NEWS, June 4, 2018; Peter Behr et al., FERC’s Aid to DOE on Grid Threats: Too Far Or Just Right?, E&E
NEWS (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2018/08/14/stories/1060094027.
109. See generally TREVOR HOUSER, PETER MARSTERS, COLUMBIA/SIPA CTR. ON GLOBAL
ENERGY POLICY, CAN COAL MAKE A COMEBACK? (Apr. 2017); BRETT JORDAN, IAN LANGE, &
JOSHUA LINN, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, COAL DEMAND, MARKET FORCES, AND US COAL
MINE CLOSURES (Apr. 2018). Legions of articles report on the decline of coal. See, e.g., Benjamin Storrow, Big, Young Power Plants Are Closing: Is It a New Trend?, E&E NEWS (Apr. 27, 2017),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060053677; Dylan Brown, Production Costs, not Natural Gas, Closed
More Mines—Study, E&E NEWS (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/stories/1060078177.
110. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2019 94-95 (Jan. 24, 2019)
(hereinafter EIA 2019 OUTLOOK).
111.

Id. at 14.

112.

Id.

113. U.S Natural Gas Marketed Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9050us2a.htm.
114.

EIA 2019 OUTLOOK, supra note 110, at 69.

115. Mike Lee, “Shale Gas” Still Upending Industry After 10 Years-Report, E&E NEWS (June 21,
2018), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2018/06/21/stories/1060085923. Reportedly, output of shale
gas went from, in 2007, 51.7 billion cf/d, to 72.6 billion cf/d in 2017. Id. In 2018, experts expected that
15% of the U.S.’s production would be exported. Naureen S. Malik, America’s Gas Exports Seen Jumping
to 15 Percent of Output Next Year, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/americas-gas-exports-seen-jumpingto-15-percent-of-output-next-year.
116. Christine Buurma & Alix Steel, Chevron-Anadarko Deal Shows Why Natural Gas is Big Oil’s
Future, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Apr. 12, 2019), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environmentand-energy/chevron-anadarko-deal-shows-why-natural-gas-is-big-oils-future.
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117

clear power, and 17% from renewable energy. In the U.S., as in Europe, natural
118
gas even recently surpassed coal as the leader in GHG emissions. EIA, consequently, projects that natural gas will “[remain] the dominant fuel in the electric
119
power sector through 2050.” Consumption of natural gas could also increase
through 2050 (with marginal growth in the rate of increase in consumption after
120
2020), although it is not expected to keep pace with increased production. And
while a rise in LNG exports may demand additional infrastructure, EIA’s typical
121
case projects that exports might stabilize by around 2030.
Almost immediately upon being inaugurated, President Trump issued several
Executive Orders designed to promote, in part, energy infrastructure projects. Executive Order 13,766, Expediting Environmental Reviews and Approvals of High Priority Infrastructure Projects announced the Administration’s policy of streamlining
and expediting infrastructure projects, particularly those of a “high priority for the
122
Nation.” On March 28, 2017, the White House issued Executive Order 13,783,
Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, directing that agencies review
all their regulations, policies, guidance, and orders to explore where unnecessary
obstacles, delays, or costs are hindering the “siting, permitting, production, utiliza123
tion, transmission, or delivery of energy resources.” Then in April 2017, the
White House released Executive Order 13,795, Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy, announcing a priority for increasing domestic energy produc124
tion from federal lands and waters. In the summer of 2017, the President issued
yet another order, this time on Establishing Discipline and Accountability in the Envi125
ronmental Review and Permitting Process for Infrastructure. In March and early
April 2018, twelve agencies signed a Memorandum of Understanding Implementing
One Federal Decision Under Executive Order 13807, which provides an umbrella structure for agencies to explore how to achieve a two year permitting schedule for cov126
ered projects and specifically addresses agency engagement with the FERC.

117. Power Sector Pushed Domestic U.S. Natural Gas Consumption to New Record in 2018, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=38812.
118. Benjamin Storrow, Move Over, Coal: Gas Now Emits More CO2 in U.S., E&E NEWS (Dec. 9,
2019), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2019/12/09/stories/1061760587.
119.

EIA 2019 OUTLOOK, supra note 110, at 92.

120. Id. at 34, 72. Although natural gas consumption increases marginally in the electric sector, it
increases more significantly among industrial users—which includes for LNG export. Id. at 82.
121.

Id. at 84-85.

122.

Exec. Order No. 13,766, 3 C.F.R. 261 (2018).

123.

Exec. Order No. 13,783, 3 C.F.R. 314 (2018).

124.

Exec. Order No. 12,795, 3 C.F.R. 340 (2018).

125.

Exec. Order No. 13,807, 3 C.F.R. 369 (2018).

126. Nick Sobczyk, Agencies Sign Agreement to Speed Permitting, E&E NEWS (Apr. 9, 2018),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060078515; see generally Nick Sobczyk, ‘Discussion Draft’ Would Make
Big Changes to NEPA, E&E NEWS (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060072251.
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In spring 2019, the President issued two additional Executive Orders designed
127
to mute states’ role in permitting energy projects and “boost oil and gas.” Issued
on April 10, 2019, one Executive Order recaptured the President’s authority delegated to the Department of State to issue permits for cross-border energy transportation projects, such as those presented by TransCanada’s Keystone XL oil pipe128
line. Ostensibly this move appears designed to shield the approval from judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act and obviate compliance with
129
NEPA. The other Executive Order describes the federal government’s duty to
“promote efficient . . . processes” for permitting energy infrastructure projects,
both by limiting states’ ability to veto or condition projects that might have an effect on water quality, and by directing the development of regulations and guidance that would ensure a two year permitting schedule for new energy infrastruc130
ture. It also sparked controversy by further ordering the promulgation of
131
regulations for transporting LNG by rail. As reporter Zach Coleman observed,
“[t]he Trump administration’s plan to soften methane standards for the oil and gas
industry is the first step in a larger effort to dismantle greenhouse gas rules for the
132
booming sector.”
But what about the infrastructure necessary to support this boom, and
FERC’s response?

127. Ariel Wittenberg & Kelsey Brugger, Trump’s Orders Target States’ Rights to Boost Oil and Gas,
E&E NEWS (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060151873; see also Clifford
Krauss, Trump Signs Orders to Speed up Oil and Gas Pipeline Construction, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2019; Kelsey Brugger et al., What’s in Trump’s Energy Orders?, E&E NEWS (Apr. 9, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060150115; Kelsey Brugger et al., Trump’s Energy Orders
Spark Partisan and Legal Brawl, E&E NEWS (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/
1060153471.
128. Exec. Order No. 13,867, 84 Fed. Reg. 15,491 (Apr. 15, 2019). The State Department did
retain its authority to receive, process, and make recommendations on applications. Id.
129.

See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-37 (2018).

130.

Exec. Order No. 13,868, 84 Fed. Reg. 15,495 (Apr. 15, 2019).

131. See Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Trump Plan to Ship Natural Gas by Rail Stokes “Bomb Train” Fears,
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-11/trumpplan-to-ship-natural-gas-by-rail-stokes-bomb-train-fears. One environmental attorney feared a disaster
waiting to happen, with trains carrying “extraordinarily flammable and dangerous substance through
highly populated areas.” Id. The industry, however, counters how “[t]his form of liquefied natural gas is
already being shipped all around the world all the time, including within the U.S., where it is driven in
trucks to storage facilities.” Haley Zaremba, Environmentalists’ “Bomb Train” Concerns Are Overblown,
OILPRICE.COM (Apr. 13, 2019), https://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/Environmentalists-BombTrain-Concerns-Are-Overblown.html. In October 2019, the Administration released its draft proposal
for promoting LNG by rail. Mike Lee, Trump Admin Unveils Rule Greenlighting LNG by Rail, E&E
NEWS (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/10/21/stories/1061333429.
132. Zack Coleman, Trump’s Move On Methane Begins Bigger Effort on Potent Gas, E&E NEWS
(Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2018/09/12/stories/1060096615; see also Bess Levin, Trump’s “Insane” New Energy Policy Would Put Global Warming on Steroids, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 11,
2018), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/09/trumps-insane-new-energy-policy-would-put-globalwarming-on-steroids.
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III. THE NEW PIPELINE WARS
Several issues seem to populate most conversations about FERC and the Department of Energy’s (DOE) approach toward promoting natural gas production.
Some are merely technical, such as the increasing ability to coordinate natural gas
133
infrastructure with electric power generation. Other issues, however, are more
fundamental. The first is how to ensure that state and local communities can participate in ensuring that environmental considerations are not relegated to afterthoughts by FERC’s pipeline policies. The second is the escalating war between
landowners and pipeline companies over the use of the existing condemnation process. The third area is the public debate at the Commission and the D.C. Circuit
over whether the Commission should consider, when issuing a certificate, the incremental effect of increased GHG emissions from both downstream and upstream
activities. The Commission even acknowledges aspects of these controversies, issuing in April 2018 a notice of inquiry soliciting public input on not only these contentious issues but an additional question surrounding the Commission’s pipeline
134
certificate policy.

A. State, Local, and Environmental Interests
Long distance pipelines transport natural gas hundreds—perhaps thousands—
of miles, and in doing so naturally attract the attention of an array of local interests. Often this transported gas is destined for markets or consumers far removed
from the pipeline route itself, leaving the pipeline certificate applicant with few
natural allies. Occasionally, adversaries express concern with ruptures, water crossings, endangered species impacts, effects on historic artifacts and Native American
135
traditional cultural properties, and the increased overall production and consumption of fossil fuels.
At least since the early 1990s, safety concerns have acutely impacted local
communities. Early in the morning on March 23, 1994, a “wall of flame” in Edison, N.J. carried ash almost two miles when Texas Eastern Transmission Corp’s
136
137
pipeline ruptured and left roughly 100 injured. New Jersey Senator Bill Brad133. See MIT, FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 15-16 (2011) (discussing interdependence and noting how natural gas’ abundance can serve as
a bridge with a “safe landing place in a low carbon future”). See infra note 264 and accompanying text.
134.

Certification of New Interstate National Gas Facilities, 163 FERC ¶ 61,042 (Apr. 19, 2018).

135. The Dakota Access oil pipeline serves as an exemplar of the devastating potential effects on
Native American communities and their cultural properties and resources—similar to the effect that
developing the Canadian tar sands for the Keystone XL line would have on the First Nations of Canada. See Troy A. Eid, Beyond Dakota Access Pipeline: Energy Development and the Imperative for Meaningful
Tribal Consultation, 95 DEN. L. REV. 593, 599-602 (2018); Mary Kathryn Nagle, Environmental Justice
and Tribal Sovereignty: Lessons from Standing Rock, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 667, 678-81 (2018).
136. Richard Pérez-Peňa, Huge Gas Pipeline Explosion Rocks Northeast New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 24, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/24/nyregion/huge-gas-pipeline-explosion-rocksnortheast-new-jersey.html.
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ley blamed a “breakdown in the regulatory and safety program,” eliciting calls for
138
reform. Nevertheless, in Appalachia, landslides contributed to at least six explosions in 2018; an explosion of a line north of Boston in 2018 devastated many
homes and killed a resident; and in 2019, a gas pipeline ruptured in Kentucky, kill139
ing one person and injuring several others. Safety concerns continue to plague
the industry, although in October 2019 the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safe140
ty Administration (PHMSA) finally adopted a more expansive safety program.
The industry must now also confront an escalating chorus of local environmental and land use concerns regarding the perils of new pipeline proposals. For
example, proponents of the 678-mile Ruby Pipeline that would transport gas from
Wyoming to Oregon embarked on an aggressive campaign to curry favor with af141
fected Wyoming counties. But project construction impacts associated with water-crossings left the project vulnerable to a successful Endangered Species Act
142
(ESA) challenge—albeit only after the project construction was completed! In
the early 1990s, the 370 mile and $583 million Iroquois Pipeline was set to deliver

137. Robert Hanley, Edison Ready to Reopen Gas Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 1994),
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/12/nyregion/edison-ready-to-reopen-gas-pipeline.html.
138. Clifford J. Levy, Pipeline Blast Said to Show Flaws in Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 1994),
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/20/nyregion/pipeline-blast-said-to-show-flaws-in-rules.html. Two
years later, Congress passed the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act. But
even so, five years later, another explosion in Bellingham, Washington killed three people, and Congress responded by strengthening the Act. See generally TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., NAT’L ACADS. OF
SCI., TRANSMISSION PIPELINES AND LAND USE: A RISK-INFORMED APPROACH—SPECIAL REPORT
281 (2004). And yet 14 years later, with another devastating explosion in San Bruno, California that
injured over 50 people and killed 7, Congressman Fred Upton (a prominent energy-focused Republican) observed, “[p]ipelines are the arteries of our Nation’s energy infrastructure. Through our hundreds
of thousands of miles of pipelines we transport the energy that fuels our economy, heats our homes, and
powers our daily lives. Unfortunately, recent accidents have thrust this vital infrastructure into the
headlines for the wrong reasons and perhaps highlighted the need for safety reassessments.” Pipeline
Safety Oversight and Legis.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Environment of the Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 111th Cong. 3, Serial No. 111-159 (2010) (statement of Rep. Upton, Member, H. Comm.
Energy and Commerce). Since then, Congress has passed the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty,
and Job Creation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-90, 125 Stat. 1904, as well as the Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety (PIPES) Act of 2016, Pub. L. 114-183, 130 Stat. 154.
139. See Mike Soraghan, Landslides, Explosions Spark Fear in Pipeline Country, E&E NEWS (June 4,
2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060472727 (discussing the Appalachian region topography and
problems associated with constructing lines in that region).
140. Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Transmission Pipelines: MAOP Reconfirmation, Expansion
of Assessment Requirements, and Other Related Amendments, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,180 (Oct. 1, 2019) (to
be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 191 and 192); Pipeline Safety: Safety of Hazardous Liquid Pipelines, 84
Fed. Reg. 52,260 (Oct. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 195); Pipeline Safety: Enhanced Emergency Order Procedures, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,015 (Oct. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 190); see
generally Sara Gosman, Justifying Safety: The Paradox of Rationality, 90 TEMPLE L. REV. 155 (2018) (detailing the history of the pipeline safety program).
141. See Emilene Ostlind, More Surprises Flow From Ruby Pipeline, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Sept.
17, 2010), https://www.hcn.org/blogs/goat/more-surprises-flow-from-ruby-pipeline.
142.

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. BLM, 698 F.3d 1101, 1006 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012).
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natural gas from the Canadian border to Long Island. Strange bedfellows opposed
the pipeline: a group of landowners along the proposed path and energy producers
143
favoring U.S. production. Notwithstanding the community opposition, the project received a § 7 certificate from FERC in 1990 and a CWA permit from the
144
Army Corps the following year. Several years after the pipeline became operational, information surfaced that the company violated environmental laws when
145
constructing through wetlands and streams.
The NGA’s savings clause ensures the Act accommodates some of these concerns. Although the NGA occupies the field and generally preempts many state
146
and local requirements, it specifically disclaims preempting the CWA, the CAA,
147
and the Coastal Zone Management Act. Local siting requirements are generally
148
considered preempted by the NGA. In Dominion Resources, FERC reaffirmed its
143. Amy Brooke Baker, Opposition Clogs Gas Pipeline Plan, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 14, 1990),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1990-08-14-9003080013-story.html.
144. Permit Is Issued for Gas Pipeline to Long Island: 370-Mile Project to Run South from Canada,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1991. The CWA § 404 program requires a permit for any discharge of dredged or
fill material into jurisdictional waters. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1344 (2018). Typically, pipelines can rely
upon a nationwide permit (NWP) and avoid a lengthier review, public participation, and permitting
process. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1344. States, however, can condition the availability of a NWP in the state
by attaching special conditions. The Mountain Valley Pipeline attempted to use a NWP, but it became
problematic when the Corps attempted to supplant West Virginia’s condition on the availability of the
NWP in that state. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 909 F.3d 635 (4th Cir. 2018) (also holding that the state could not waive its special condition).
145. See Joseph Berger, Pipeline Supervisors Charged with Harming Environment, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
17, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/17/nyregion/pipeline-supervisors-charged-with-harmingenvironment.html.
146.

See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988).

147. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d) (2018). In 2005, Congress provided a mechanism for expedited judicial
review for other required federal or state authorizations. 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d); e.g., Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers, 723 F.3d 238 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (remanding to require Maryland to process air
permit). The court later explained Summers as avoiding what local requirements might be preempted by
FERC’s order, noting on remand the only non-preempted requirement was a construction site plan.
Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty. v. FERC, 783 F.3d 1301, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
148. See Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 293; Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC v. Town of Weymouth, 919 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2019) (ordinance preempted); Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers,
723 F.3d 238, 243 (D.C. Cir. 2013); cf. Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec’y Pa. Dept. of Envtl. Prot.,
903 F.3d 65 (3d Cir. 2018) (suggesting court might explore application of state constitutional law); Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC v. Nelson Cty Bd. of Supervisors, 2020 WL 1151073 (W.D. Va. Mar. 3,
2020) (non-federally approved local regulatory authority preempted). The preemptive effect of the
NGA is addressed as well in Fed. Power Comm’n v. So. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964) and Ill.
Nat. Gas Co. v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 315 U.S. 498 (1942). See supra note 72 and accompanying text
(describing Energy Policy Act 2005 and LNG facilities); Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty. v.
FERC, 783 F.3d 1301, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also Sound Energy Solutions, 107 FERC ¶ 61,263,
para. 14 (2004) (discussing scope of jurisdiction and preemption). In 1981, DOE ensured that FERC
would have authority over siting of LNG facilities, and in 1997 FERC issued § 3 regulations. Order
No. 595, 62 Fed. Reg. 20,435 (June 4, 1997). In 1999, FERC issued NEPA filing regulations for LNG
facilities. Order No. 603, 64 Fed. Reg. 26,582 (May 14, 1999), amended Order No. 603-A, 64 Fed. Reg.
54,537 (Oct. 7, 1999), Order No. 609, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,392 (Oct. 25, 1999); see generally Russell Koois-
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practice of encouraging certificate holders to cooperate with local governments, but
149
it did not expressly require cooperation as a condition of a certificate. FERC often avoids opining on whether a particular state program is preempted. Instead,
the Commission generally avoids any direct conflict with states by issuing a conditional certificate with a condition requiring, for instance, the receipt of any required environmental clearances before construction may proceed. This ploy ini150
tially seemed problematic and invited challenges, while today it is commonly
151
accepted.
Section 401 of the CWA, in particular, remains a principal irritant for the
pipeline industry, as some states are testing whether § 401 can become an avenue
for examining and potentially halting fossil-fuel development. Section 401 applies
to pipeline certificates when an activity “may result in any discharge into the navi152
gable waters.” States must be reasonably assured “that the activity will be con153
ducted in a manner which will not violate applicable water quality standards,”
154
and they may attach conditions to a certificate issuance.

tra, Note, How FERC Confuses the Role of State and Local Authorities in Regulating Certified Natural Gas
Pipelines, J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 59 (Winter 2015).
149. Dominion Transmission, Inc., Order Denying Reh’g, 163 FERC ¶ 61,128, para. 24 (2018);
see also Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, para. 309 (2017) (“Any state or local permits issued with respect to the jurisdictional facilities authorized herein must be consistent with the
conditions of this certificate. We encourage cooperation between interstate pipelines and local authorities. However, this does not mean that state and local agencies, through application of state or local
laws, may prohibit or unreasonably delay the construction or operation of facilities approved by this
Commission.”).
150. See Oregon v. FERC, 636 F.3d 1203, 1204 (9th Cir. 2011) (issue was being litigated but
case dismissed when developer filed for bankruptcy); Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Envtl. Control v.
FERC 558 F.3d 575, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (because certificate was conditional, and thus arguably no
immediate injury, state lacked standing); see also Crown Landing LLC, 117 FERC ¶ 61,209 (2006).
151. E.g., Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,197, para. 62 (2018) (order on reh’g),
aff’d Appalachian Voices v. FERC, 2019 WL 847199 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 19, 2019); see also Township of
Bordentown v. FERC, 903 F.3d 234, 246 (3d Cir. 2018) (“FERC’s practice . . . complies with the plain
language of the CWA.”); Town of Weymouth v. FERC, No. 17-1135 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 27, 2018) (unpublished) (conditional compliance with the Coastal Zone Management Act); Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 870 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 2017) (reviewing CWA compliance);
Myersville, 783 F.3d at 1319 (rejecting challenge to conditional certificate); Islander E. Pipeline Co. v.
McCarthy, 525 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2008); Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. Conn. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 482
F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2006). The D.C. Circuit also implicitly upheld this practice when denying an
NGO standing in Gunpowder Riverkeeper v. FERC, 807 F.3d 267, 270 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
152. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2018); e.g., Appalachian Voices v. State Water Control Bd., 912 F.3d
746, 752-59 (2019); Sierra Club v. State Water Bd., 898 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2018).
153.

40 C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(3) (2019).

154. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994). Since 2005,
challenges to state action or inaction occur before a court of appeals. See Channing Jones, The Natural
Gas Act, State Environmental Policy, and the Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Courts, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 163 (2016) (suggesting limiting aspects of federal review, although subsequent cases suggest otherwise).
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The pipeline industry first exhibited notable concern with the § 401 program
155
during the proposed Iroquois Pipeline. That concern quickly dissipated but has
recently returned. Both Washington and New York recently wielded their § 401
156
authority in a manner some find troublesome. New York Department of Environmental Conservation’s (NYDEC) decision denying certification to the Constitution Pipeline became a cause célèbre when the company failed to provide suffi157
cient information regarding alternative routes. New York also objected to
FERC’s decision to treat the state as having waived its CWA § 401 authority to
158
object to the Millennium Pipeline. The state delayed its review, concluding the
159
applicant had not submitted a complete application. When it finally denied certification, it reasoned that FERC’s environmental analysis overlooked the effects
160
from indirect downstream GHG emissions. Because the state received the application over two years earlier on November 23, 2015, FERC concluded the state
waived its § 401 certification. The Second Circuit agreed with FERC, construing
the plain language of § 401 as being triggered upon “receipt” of a certification re161
quest. When, however, the NYDEC tried to persuade FERC that the Northern
Access Pipeline needed to furnish additional information before the agency could
162
ensure compliance with § 401, FERC informed the state it ran out of time. New
163
York challenged that decision.
155. I was personally involved in these issues as a practitioner during this period. See also Nat’l
Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 894 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1990).
156. See Ariel Wittenberg, EPA Curbs State Power to Deny Permits for Climate Concerns, E&E
NEWS (June 7, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060510579. Environmental groups pressed
Washington Department of Ecology to exercise § 401 authority and review the environmental and climate impacts of a proposed LNG terminal in Tacoma, Washington. Pamela King, Greens Sue to Block
Wash. LNG Permit, E&E NEWS (July 11, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/
stories/1060722199.
157. Constitution Pipeline Co. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 868 F.3d 87 (2d Cir.
2017). FERC subsequently concluded the state waived its § 401 authority. Constitution Pipeline Co.,
168 FERC ¶ 61,129 (Aug. 28, 2019); cf. Niina H. Farah, Court Halts FERC, N.Y. Fight Over Constitution
Pipeline, E&E NEWS (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2020/04/09/stories/
1062823895.
158. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 2018), earlier case
Millennium Pipeline Co. v. Seggos, 860 F.3d 696 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
159.

884 F.3d at 454.

160.

Id.

161. Id. at 455-56. New York argued that “requiring state agencies to act on a request within one
year will force it to render premature decisions. Among other harms . . . such a requirement may undermine public notice and comment, impede a state from working with the applicant to refile in accordance with its requirements, and prompt applicants to flood the courts of appeal.” Id. at 456.
162. Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp., 167 FERC ¶ 61,007 (2019). The Second Circuit already vacated and remanded the state certification decision back to the agency. Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v.
N.Y. State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 761 Fed. App’x 68 (2d Cir. Feb. 5, 2019). FERC reaffirmed
its approach toward waiver when declaring that New York waived its ability to issue or deny certification for the Constitution Pipeline, relying on Hoopa Valley Tribe. Constitution Pipeline Co., 168 FERC
¶ 61,129 (Aug. 28, 2019). The Supreme Court rejected a request to decide whether states waive their
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Some interested observers suggest that states are “abusing” their CWA au164
thority.
According to the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America
(INGAA), the traditional federal/state balance “has been disrupted and some states
have viewed Section 401 as a means of determining which interstate pipeline pro165
jects are in the public interest and which are not.” That concern may be somewhat exaggerated, as even the controversial Atlantic Coast Pipeline received a §
166
401 certification that survived judicial review. To be sure, the fate of Northern
Access is still uncertain, and the Manhattan Institute suggests that blocking North167
ern Access will contribute to future gas shortages in the region. A senior Republican Senator nevertheless floated legislative language designed to arrest some of
168
these state efforts. The National Conference of State Legislatures, however, expressed concern that such proposals thwart the CWA’s model for dual federal-

right to certification if they cooperate with an applicant and allow the applicant the opportunity to
withdraw and resubmit a certification request. Cal. Trout v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 913 F.3d 1099 (D.C.
Cir. 2019), cert. denied, (Dec. 9, 2019) (No. 19-257).
163. See Pamela King, N.Y. Challenges FERC Approval of Northern Access, E&E NEWS (May 31,
2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060435951; see also Ryan Collins, New York Denies
Gas Pipe Again as Trump Eyes Permit Speedup, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Aug. 9, 2019),
https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/new-york-denies-gas-pipe-again-astrump-eyes-permit-speedup.
164. E.g., Daren Bakst, Commentary, States Abusing Federal Provision to Block Critical Projects,
CNSNEWS.COM (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.cnsnews.com/commentary/daren-bakst/states-abusingfederal-provision-block-critical-projects. In November 2019, Oklahoma’s Governor testified at a Senate
hearing complaining how some states were abusing their authority. Water Quality Certification Reform
Hearing on S. 1087 Before the Senate Env’t & Public Works Comm., 116th Cong. 1 (Nov. 19, 2019)
(statement of Hon. J. Kevin Stitt, Governor, Oklahoma).
165. Press Release, INGAA, INGAA Statement on EPA Clean Water 401 Guidance (June 7,
2019) (available at https://www.ingaa.org/News/PressReleases/36506.aspx.). In April 2018, the natural
gas industry wrote President Trump requesting federal guidance that would limit state authority. See
Letter from the Nat. Gas Council, to President Donald J. Trump (Apr. 10, 2018) (available at
https://www.ingaa.org/File.aspx?id=34275&source=generalSearch.). Other states are exploring the
scope of their authority: a Maryland legislator, for instance, asked their state attorney general to assess
the constitutionality of proposed changes to that state’s water quality certification program for pipelines. Letter from Attorney General of Maryland, to Hon. Charles J. Otto (Feb. 18, 2019) (on file with
author); see generally Mike Lee, Bill to Slow Pipeline Permitting Gains Speed in Md., E&E NEWS (Mar. 8,
2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/03/08/stories/1060123473 (reporting on a Maryland
bill that will promote public access for the permitting process).
166.

Appalachian Voices v. State Water Control Bd., 912 F.3d 746 (4th Cir. 2019).

167. ROBERT BRYCE, MANHATTAN INST., OUT OF GAS: NEW YORK’S BLOCKED PIPELINES
WILL HURT NORTHEAST CONSUMERS (June 25, 2019).
168. See Barrasso Reintroduces Legislation to Improve Water Quality Certifications, Press Releases, U.S.
SENATE COMM, ON ENV’T AND PUB. WORKS (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.epw.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/2019/4/barrasso-reintroduces-legislation-to-improve-water-quality-certifications. An
interesting student note suggests legislation that would afford states the ability to exercise their authority upon performing a cost/benefit analysis. Jason Bressler, Note, Blocking Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines:
How to Curb Climate Change While Strengthening the Nation’s Energy System, 44 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137
(2019).
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169

ism. President Trump’s April 2019 Executive Order 13,868 directed that EPA
170
issue new guidance for state compliance with § 401. EPA responded on June 7,
171
2019, principally clarifying that states must act within the established or extended (between the agency and the state) timeframe or waive their § 401 authority,
and that § 401 and the state conditioning authority under § 401(d) is limited to wa172
ter quality concerns. Several state attorneys general responded by attacking
EPA’s guidance and asking for its rescission or revision, informing the agency they
173
will follow prior binding requirements for the certification process. EPA then
174
followed its guidance with proposed regulations. While this feud appears likely
to continue throughout this administration, it seems less likely than the challenge
by landowners to affect natural gas policymaking too much.

B. The Pipeline Wars with Landowners
An industry cherished feature of the NGA is that, once a natural gas company
receives a § 7 certificate of public convenience and necessity, it secures a federal
175
right to exercise eminent domain. Typically, eminent domain authority, or the
authority to condemn private property upon payment of just compensation, can be
exercised only by governmental entities or by those with delegated authority from
a governmental authority that enjoys eminent domain power under the Federal or
a state constitution. Electric transmission line developers, therefore, lack federal
eminent domain authority—a principal problem according to many in that industry. But Congress granted eminent domain authority to private entities for the

169. See William T. Pound, Letter to the Honorable Mitch McConnell RE: Protecting States’
Authorities Under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures (Oct. 3, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/standcomm/scnri/CWA_401_CongressFINAL.pdf.
170.

Exec. Order No. 13,868, 84 Fed. Reg. 15,495 (Apr. 15, 2019).

171. EPA, CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 401 GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES, STATES
AND AUTHORIZED TRIBES (2019), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-06/documents/
cwa_section_401_guidance.pdf [hereinafter CWA SECTION 401 GUIDANCE]. EPA issued proposed
regulations on August 8, 2019. Updating Regulations on Water Quality, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,080 (proposed
Aug. 22, 2019).
172. Id. Absent regulatory changes, one industry lawyer suggested the guidance will not likely
chill state efforts. See David Schultz, EPA Guidance May Not Keep States from Blocking Pipelines,
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (June 11, 2019), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/us-law-week/epaguidance-may-not-keep-states-from-blocking-pipelines?context=article-related.
173. Attorneys General of California, Connecticut, Maryland, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Comment Letter on Clean Water Act Section
401 Guidance for Federal Agencies, States, and Authorized Tribes (July 25, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/
system/files/attachments/press-docs/State%20AG%20Comments%20on%20Section%20401%20
Guidance-FINAL%2019-0725.pdf.
174. CWA SECTION 401 GUIDANCE, supra note 171; Updating Regulations on Water Quality, 84
Fed. Reg. 44,080.
175.

See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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construction of interstate pipelines, if the interstate pipeline receives a Certificate
176
of Public and Convenience and Necessity from FERC.
For many interstate natural gas companies, eminent domain authority is a
backstop. Companies generally prefer to negotiate with landowners and avoid emi177
nent domain proceedings. As one of the three prerequisites for exercising eminent domain authority, the company must, after all, demonstrate that it attempted
178
to negotiate with the landowner. Kinder Morgan, one of the largest interstate
pipeline companies, defends the right of eminent domain as a necessary tool for
preventing any single landowner from having the ability to veto a project or hold a
179
project hostage. The company’s approach is to secure rights-of-way “on a volun176. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2018); see supra note 67. For intrastate pipelines or electric transmission
developers, states vary on how they approach affording companies eminent domain authority. And often the use of state eminent domain authority precipitates dialogues about how far such authority
should extend. See Travis Bubenik, New Push for Eminent Domain Reform Expected at Texas Legislature,
KUT 90.5-NPR (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.kut.org/post/new-push-eminent-domain-reform-expectedtexas-legislature.
177. In July 2018, the member companies of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America,
the industry’s principal trade association, adopted a resolution that they would negotiate in good faith
with landowners and exercise their right to eminent domain “only . . . as a means of last resort.”
INTERSTATE NAT. GAS ASS’N OF AM., COMMITMENTS TO LANDOWNERS (2018). Also, “[t]he Commission has long expressed a preference for minimizing the need for certificate holders to resort to eminent domain to acquire land for a given project.” Birckhead v. FERC, 925 F.3d 510, 516 (D.C. Cir.
2019).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2018). The other two are that the value exceeds $3,000 and that it
holds a § 7 certificate. Id. A demonstration of good faith negotiations, however, may not be necessary.
See Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, LLC v. Decoulos, 146 Fed. App’x 495, 498 (1st Cir. 2005) (not
requiring demonstration of good faith); Millennium Pipeline Co. v. Certain Permanent & Temp.
Easements, 777 F. Supp.2d 475, 482 (W.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d 552 Fed. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2014) (same);
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. Booth, 2016 WL 7439348, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 22, 2016) (examining the issue and concluding that majority of modern courts reject inquiry into good faith); Kansas
Pipeline Co. v. 200 Foot by 250 Foot Piece of Land, 210 F. Supp.2d 1253, 1256 (D. Kan. 2002) (not
required to show good faith); Guardian Pipeline, LLC v. 529.42 Acres of Land, 210 F. Supp.2d 971,
973-4 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“[The Court is] unaware of any case in which condemnation has been denied or
even delayed because of an alleged failure to engage in good faith negotiations.”). But see Transcon. Gas
Pipe Line Corp. v. 118 Acres of Land, 745 F. Supp. 366, 369-70 (E.D. La. 1990) (earlier case involving
gas storage implicitly suggesting applying state law imposing a requirement for good faith negotiation,
although not finding a good faith violation). Some states require good faith negotiations during eminent
domain proceedings, and the NGA provides “[t]he practice and procedure in any action or proceeding
for [the] purpose [of exercising eminent domain] . . . shall conform as nearly as may be with the practice
and procedure in similar action or proceeding in the courts of the State where the property is situated.”
15 U.S.C. § 717f(h). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1 arguably negates this language, at least in
some circuits. See In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 2018 WL 6584893 *16 (D.N.J., Dec. 14, 2018); see also
Transcon. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d 725 (3d Cir. 2018), earlier
op. Transcon. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 2.59 Acres, 709 Fed. App’x 109, 111 (3d Cir.
2017). FERC too interprets the NGA as not requiring good faith negotiations. Mountain Valley Pipeline, 163 FERC ¶ 61,197 (2018) (order on reh’g). A showing of diligence in searching for landowners
with partial interests may be necessary when a company seeks a default judgment against absentee landowners. E.g., Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC v. 2.58 Acres, 2020 WL 291839 (W.D. Va. Jan. 21, 2020).
179.

See KINDER MORGAN, WHITE PAPER: EMINENT DOMAIN 3 (2015).
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tary basis.” To be sure, the threat of condemnation serves as a powerful incentive for landowners to negotiate. In a condemnation proceeding, the landowner is
entitled to receive only the fair market value for the pipeline easement across the
181
property. During the negotiation process with the pipeline company, therefore, a
landowner must gamble on whether the risk of proceeding in court outweighs an
offer by the company. According to some private property right advocates, that
negotiation process generally lacks the usual trimmings of an equal bargaining process, often affording the landowner only limited ability to secure favorable terms
182
and conditions.
If the negotiation process fails, the condemnation proceeding is limited to adjudicating the fair market value of the easement. The pipeline company typically
initiates an eminent domain proceeding in federal district court, although a state
183
forum is available. Generally, federal courts disclaim any authority to examine
the terms and conditions of the right-of-way, or the necessity for the right-of-away
184
across that particular landowner’s property. Those issues, instead, are reserved
exclusively to FERC’s jurisdiction and subsequent review by the appropriate Unit185
ed States Court of Appeal. Once the company receives its certificate, therefore,
it enjoys the right “to obtain automatically the necessary right of way through eminent domain, with the only issue being the compensation the landowner defendant
186
will receive in return for the easement.” The FERC § 7 proceeding, consequently, is where a landowner can raise any concerns about the potential easement across
180.

Id.

181. See e.g., Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 1.30 Acres of Land, 2019 WL 4306981 (Sept. 11,
2019) (discussing evidence for fair market value); Mountain Valley Pipeline v. 1.81 Acres of Land, 2019
WL 4007924 (W.D. Va. Aug. 23, 2019) (same). While it should be apparent that federal principles for
just compensation apply, the Third Circuit oddly suggested it would incorporate state law as the federal
standard—albeit suggesting that federal law is a floor and state law can add damages for consideration.
Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, 931 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2019). Cf. UGI
Sunbury LLC v. Permanent Easement for 1,7575 Acres, 949 F.3d (3d Cir. 2020) (applying FRE 702
and Daubert standard to exclude stigma damages from just compensation).
182. See Jonathan Wood, Pipelines v. Property
https://www.perc.org/2017/11/07/pipelines-v-property-rights/.

Rights,

PERC

(Nov.

7,

2017),

183. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. A state forum may not be available for a pipeline
with a conditional certificate and no § 401 certification. See Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Schueckler,
167 A.D.3d 128, 136-37 (S.C. App. D. 2018) (company attempted to use state instance vesting process
before obtaining the § 401 certification—which shortly thereafter was denied, and which certification
was a condition to the FERC certificate—although FERC later said the state waived its § 401 authority).
184.

Williams Nat. Gas Co. v. City of Okla. City, 890 F.2d 255, 264 (10th Cir. 1989).

185. Id.; see also Kan. Pipeline Co. v. 200 Foot by 250 Foot Piece of Land, 210 F. Supp.2d 1253,
1256 (D. Kan. 2002). In N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Approximately 9117.53 Acres, 2011 WL 2118642, at *3 (D.
Kan. May 27, 2011), the court further confirmed that landowners may not raise state claims through a
counterclaim in an NGA eminent domain proceeding. If, moreover, a landowner fails to intervene and
raise objections during the FERC proceeding, they are precluded from seeking judicial review.
186.
2014).

Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres, More or Less, 768 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir.
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its property. And when the natural gas company files its § 7 application, the landowner notification process is designed to ensure that landowners become aware of
187
what is down the road.
Pipeline opponents and frustrated landowners are waging battles against this
188
process. Even FERC’s Notice of Inquiry (NOI) invited commentary as part of
189
this conversation. Generally, critics decry the process as denying landowners
their due process rights and guarantee against having property taken for a public
use without just compensation. The libertarian Niskanen Center, for instance, argues that FERC’s process for affording notice to landowners is inadequate, too
short, and so confusing that it deprives property owners of procedural due pro190
cess. Its argument proceeds from the correct proposition that objections to a
pipeline must be adjudicated in the FERC process, and only intervenors in the
191
agency’s process can challenge a FERC decision in a petition for judicial review.
It then suggests that inadequate notice and impediments to intervention impose
192
significant and unfair hurdles for many affected landowners. The notice problem
is exemplified, it adds, for pipelines like the controversial Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) that cross areas where it is likely the landowners are uneducated and
193
less able to appreciate the implications of any notice. Finally, Niskanen posits
that FERC’s use of tolling orders and conditional certificates violates the Due Process Clause. Tolling orders might delay a landowner’s day in court for six months
or more; conditional certificates might allow taking a property interest even

187. See 18 C.F.R. §§ 157.6(a)(2), (3) (2019), 157.6(d) (landowner notification); 18 C.F.R.
§ 157.7 (2019) (abbreviated filing under 18 C.F.R. § 385.2011, re electronic media); 18 C.F.R. § 157.21
(2019) (pre-filing requirements, including stakeholder involvement); 18 C.F.R. § 380.15 (2019) (siting
and maintenance requirements); FERC, DOE, Revisions to Landowner Notification and Blanket Certificate Regulations, 72 Fed. Reg. 59,939 (Oct. 23, 2007); FERC, BLANKET CERTIFICATE PROGRAM:
NOTICE TO LANDOWNERS (2007); see also FERC, DOE, Landowner Notification, Expanded Categorical Exclusions, and Other Environmental Filing Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,374, 57,377 (Oct. 25,
1999) (“The Commission’s intent behind the landowner notification requirement was that the applicant
should make a good faith effort to serve all affected landowners.”). FERC’s 2014 Order No. 790 also
included a written landowner notification requirement before an interstate natural gas pipeline could
conduct minor maintenance and replacement activities.
188. Robert McNamara & David Bookbinder, Pipeline Builders Abuse Eminent Domain, WALL ST.
J. (July 19, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pipeline-builders-abuse-eminent-domain-1532039318;
see also Ilya Somin, The Growing Battle Over the Use of Eminent Domain to Take Property for Pipelines,
WASH. POST (June 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2016/06/07/the-growing-battle-over-the-use-of-eminent-domain-to-take-property-for-pipelines/.
189.

See infra note 252 and accompanying text.

190. Niskanen Ctr., Comments in Response to FERC’s Notice of Inquiry 83 Fed. Reg. 18,020,
Docket No. PL18-1-000 (July 25, 2018).
191.

Id.

192. Id. For instance, the Center suggests that notices to landowners fail to adequately convey
that, unless they intervene in the FERC proceeding, they will be unable to challenge any FERC decision. Id. at 6.
193.

Id. at 19.
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though the pipeline may ultimately lack eminent domain authority should it fail to
194
satisfy its certificate conditions.
These and similar concerns are now surfacing as litigants hope to enlist the aid
of the judiciary in their quest to alter interstate pipelines’ use of eminent domain
authority. The MVP exemplifies this effort. The MVP is a 42-inch roughly 300195
mile line that would carry natural gas from West Virginia to southern Virginia.
Landowners along the route participated in the FERC process and objected, fear196
ing it would adversely affect the environment and pose several safety hazards. In
response, FERC noted MVP’s statement that it would engage in good faith efforts
to negotiate with landowners before exercising any eminent domain authority, and
further that the company entertained several changes to accommodate route con197
cerns. It then reiterated that the NGA affords eminent domain authority, and
the Commission’s sole responsibility is merely to determine whether the pipeline is
198
entitled to a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity under its policy.
The Commission issued its typical conditional certificate, requiring subse199
quent receipt of required environmental clearances. With that certificate in
hand, MVP then initiated condemnation proceedings in order to secure immediate
200
access to the properties. FERC specifically allows this, reasoning that its conditional certificate “prohibits parties from commencing construction, not engaging in
eminent domain proceedings, prior to obtaining all permits and satisfying all envi201
ronmental conditions.” Many of the landowners allegedly “first learned they had
been sued—and that MVP was seeking to seize part of their land immediately—
202
when they discovered a thick packet with two filings duct-taped to their doors.”
By allowing the company to proceed with filing a preliminary injunction authorizing immediate access to the property, even before all the environmental clearances
had been secured, the landowners claimed that MVP could “bulldoze large swaths
194.

Id. at 23-32.

195. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, para. 24 (2017) (MVP Order), on
rehearing Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,197 (2018).
196.

Id.

197.

Id.

198. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, para. 60 (2017). The Commission
added its certificate decision could suffice as a “public use” determination for purposes of allowing federal eminent domain authority under the Constitution. Id. para. 61. The Commission again expressed
this view on rehearing. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,197, paras. 34-39 (2018).
199. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC 61,043, at 105, app. C (2017) (requiring compliance with Appendix C environmental conditions and specifically paragraph 9).
200. E.g., Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. W. Pocahontas Props. Ltd. P’ship, 918 F.3d 353
(4th Cir. 2019); Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 1.30 Acres of Land, 2019 WL 4306981 (W.D. Va.
Sept. 11, 2019) (noting that condemnation issued on March 8, 2018); Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v.
1.81 Acres of Land, 2019 WL 4007924 (W.D. Va. Aug. 28, 2019).
201.

Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,197, para. 72.

202. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Givens v. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, No. 19-54
(U.S. July 3, 2019).
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of land along the pipeline’s route . . . [and] cut down millions of trees, dig out
hillsides, and destroy other property in carving a 125-foot-wide clear-cut swath
203
through previously pristine countryside.”
Landowners also targeted the practice of allowing a pipeline to take property
almost immediately upon the filing of a condemnation proceeding. The Declara204
tion of Taking Act (DTA) allows condemning parties the ability to “quick take”
properties upon the filing of a declaration of taking. A declaration filing vests the
205
property interest with the condemning party. Even though the DTA does not
apply to proceedings by pipeline companies acting under the authority of the
NGA, courts in the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have allowed the immediate
206
possession of property even “without the benefit of summary judgment.” In lieu
of the DTA, these courts allow an interstate pipeline company to file a motion for
preliminary injunction under FRCPs 71.1 and 65, ostensibly affording a court sufficient information about whether the company enjoys § 7(h) authority. The Third
Circuit rejected an argument that, because Congress in the NGA omitted any pro207
vision for a quick take of property, this practice violates separation of powers.
208
This is how the process unfolded with the MVP. A certiorari petition asking the
Court to resolve whether a court may “issue a preliminary injunction granting immediate possession of property to a pipeline company in a condemnation proceed209
ing under the [NGA]” was recently denied.

203. Id. at 8-9. Financial arrangements require tight pipeline construction schedules, and this
pressure may have led to MVP’s poor environmental compliance. See Mike Lee, Va. Officials Freeze
Work on Mountain Valley, E&E NEWS (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/
2019/08/05/stories/1060851223.
204.

40 U.S.C. § 3114 (2018).

205.

Id.

206. In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 2018 WL 6584893, at *14 (D.N.J., Dec. 14, 2018); see Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. Western Pocahontas Props. Ltd. P’ship, 918 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 2019);
Nexus Gas Transmission, LLC v. City of Green, No. 18-2235, 757 Fed. App’x 489 (6th Cir. Dec. 7,
2018) (allowing use of preliminary injunction); see also Dominion Energy Transmission, Inc. v. 0.11
Acres of Land, 2019 WL 4781872 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 30, 2019) (granting preliminary injunction and
immediate possession).
207. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements, 907 F.3d 725 (3d Cir. 2018) (Atlantic Sunrise Project); cf. East Tenn. Natural Gas, LLC v. 1.28 Acres in Smyth County, VA, 2006 WL
1133874 (W.D. Va. Apr. 26, 2006) (allowing immediate possession through the court’s equitable power
of issuing preliminary injunction, citing East Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 828 (4th
Cir. 2004)).
208. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. Easements to Construct, Operate, and Maintain, 2018
WL 648376 (W.D. Va. Jan. 31, 2018) (granting preliminary injunction and immediate possession but
conditioned upon company providing sufficient evidence of adequate security for compensation); see
also Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 1.30 Acres of Land, 2019 WL 4306981 (W.D. Va. Sept. 11,
2019).
209. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Givens v. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, (July 3,
2019) (No. 19-54), cert. denied (Oct. 7, 2019).
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Whether in the MVP proceeding or subsequently, it seems likely that this
210
practice will trigger heightened scrutiny. When, for instance, Transcontinental
Gas Pipe Line Company (Transco) received its certificate for the Atlantic Sunrise
211
Project, landowners sought rehearing from FERC. Even before the Commission
could resolve the rehearing request, Transco not only obtained its preliminary injunction allowing condemnation, but also received a construction order from
FERC that allowed construction activities. The company “broke ground that same
212
day.” The landowners lost their due process claim, but Judge Millett neverthe213
less described this process as “Kafkaesque.” Bound by precedent, she lamented,
“Circuit precedent gave the Commission the tools it has used to create this administrative quagmire for those who seek to challenge its decisions. In my view, we
214
should put an end to it.” She further stated that this entire process “runs rough215
shod over basic principles of fair process.” In their successful request for rehearing, petitioners urged that the court revisit its precedent in light of the current
216
practice, to avoid fostering what it argued is a Fifth Amendment violation.

210. An attempt to challenge the eminent domain process in district court failed. Berkley v.
Mountain Valley Pipeline, L.L.C., 896 F.3d 624 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 941 (2019).
Landowners secured a partial victory, however, when the D.C. Circuit told FERC it had to better explain why precedent agreements for the Nexus pipeline to ship a considerable amount of gas outside the
U.S. was in the public interest. City of Oberlin v. FERC, 937 F.3d 599, 607 (D.C. Cir. 2019); cf. Town
of Weymouth v. FERC, No. 17-1135, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Dec. 27, 2018) (unpublished) (FTA countries
can serve public interest).
211.

Transcon. Gas Pipeline Co., 161 FERC ¶ 61,250 (2017) (order on reh’g).

212.

Allegheny Def. Project v. FERC, 932 F.3d 940, 944-45 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam).

213.

Id. at 948 (Millett, J., concurring).

214. Id. at 950. Existing precedent merely upheld the use of tolling orders. Id. at 951 (citing California Co. v. FPC, 411 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam)).
215. Id. Judge Millett’s opinion provides a good analysis of the problems attendant with the
Commission’s use of tolling orders, orders that do not automatically stay the Commission’s underlying
decision and allow the Commission to avoid resolving a rehearing request before a company can condemn land and receive a construction order. Nearly a year passed from the date of the Commission’s
certificate order for the Nexus pipeline and its rehearing order, enough time for the pipeline to have
completed its condemnation proceeding. City of Oberlin, 937 F.3d at 603. Similarly, the fight over PennEast Pipeline’s ability to condemn state lands, In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 938 F.3d 96 (3d Cir.
2019), occurred before the D.C. Circuit heard oral argument in the challenge to FERC’s certificate order. PennEast also asked the Court to review the decision. Niina H. Farah, PennEast Asks Supreme Court
to Review Stand Land Grabs, E&E NEWS (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/
2020/02/25/stories/1062439925; see also Niina H. Farah, Groups: Gas Pipeline Ruling Gives States Too
Much Power, E&E NEWS (Mar. 25, 2020) (describing amicus filings), https://www.eenews.net/
energywire/stories/1062692321.
216. On December 5, 2019, the D.C. Circuit vacated its earlier opinion and ordered rehearing en
banc, scheduled for March 2020. Allegheny Def. Project v. FERC, 943 F.3d 496, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(per curiam).
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C. FERC, NEPA, and Climate Change
The third principal controversy surrounds FERC’s role in the climate change
debate. FERC historically has struggled with how to address GHG emissions in its
decisions. The NGA requires the agency to examine the “public interest,” arguably
embracing the need to explore whether a project’s ostensible contribution toward
GHG emissions warrants consideration in FERC’s balancing of the pros and cons
217
of a proposed project. NEPA requires that the Commission examine whether a
project is a major federal action that significantly affects the quality of the human
environment. In doing so it directs, in part, that FERC explore the direct, indirect,
218
and cumulative effects of its decisions —again, arguably embracing the need to
explore whether a project’s ostensible contribution toward GHG emissions warrants exploration. The State Department’s fiasco with the Keystone XL pipeline
manifested the urgency of appreciating the GHG effects associated with approving
new oil and gas pipelines. When the Council on Environmental Quality prepared
its general NEPA guidance for assessing GHG emissions, some commentators believed it would “encourage FERC to take a more Keystone-like approach to their
reviews, [and] to ask applicants to look upstream and downstream” to address
GHG emissions associated with new oil and gas wells, and to address GHG emis219
sions produced downstream when the natural gas or oil is burned.
The current Republicans on the Commission, though, openly disavow the
need to explore how their decisions could affect climate change. FERC Chairman
Neil Chatterjee, for instance, commented to then EPA Acting Administrator
Wheeler that the Clean Power Plan arguably infringed on FERC’s jurisdiction,
220
and that FERC lacks authority to address climate change under the NGA.
Chairman Chatterjee’s perspective, joined by Republican Commissioner Bernard
McNamee, has generated a public feud within the Commission about the agency’s
approach to analyzing GHG emissions during its pipeline and LNG proceedings—
221
whether under NGA § 7 or NEPA.

217. FERC’s process seemingly tilts the balance away from any holistic analysis of a project’s
pros and cons, because the Commission may preliminarily pre-determine a project’s benefits outweigh
its costs even before it has completed an EIS. See Fuel Safe Wash. v. FERC, 389 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir.
2004) (making its public benefits determination less than a month after public hearings on the draft
EIS).
218.

42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2018); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.16, 1508.7, 1508.8 (2019).

219. Hannah Northey, White House NEPA Guidance Could Trigger Change at FERC, E&E NEWS
(Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060010881.
220. Letter from Office of the Chairman Neil Chatterjee, FERC, to Acting Administrator
Wheeler, re Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Generating
Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review
Program, Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-QAR-2017-0355, Oct. 31, 2018.
221. See Rod Kuckro, McNamee, Glick Clash Over Climate, E&E NEWS (July 19, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/07/19/stories/1060757919.
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Chairman Chatterjee announced the Commission’s latest policy for addressing
GHG emissions in a 2018 decision involving the construction and upgrading of
222
compression facilities in New York to accommodate increased natural gas. Responding to questions about the sufficiency of the project’s EA or the Commission’s § 7 obligations, FERC concluded that its public interest review under the
NGA does not include an inquiry into climate change impacts. Next, the Commission reasoned that, because it cannot control either the upstream production of
natural gas or its corresponding downstream consumption, NEPA does not require
examining the effects of such production and consumption. Ostego argued that
FERC should have prepared an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and that
the Commission had to examine the upstream and downstream impacts of the pro223
ject. Next, it claimed “that unspecified emerging research regarding the project’s
impacts upon climate change and health and safety of residents are particularly
224
controversial and require the preparation of an EIS.” FERC dispatched this
claim rather quickly, suggesting that Ostego conflated controversy over the project
225
with controversy over the impacts. It also disagreed with Ostego that a modification of an existing facility allowed the Commission to revisit the environmental
impacts of the existing facility, noting its examination is “limited to the company’s
226
proposal.”
On upstream and downstream effects, Ostego challenged the Commission’s
227
failure to examine cumulative effects from increased GHG emissions. Notably,
no party suggested that upstream or downstream impacts could be examined as indirect effects, and the Commission indicated it could not sufficiently predict any
228
indirect upstream or downstream effects. The Commission admitted it had for a
time examined both production and downstream effects. It added, though, that
229
such an analysis was unnecessary under NEPA and too generic and specula-

222. Dominion Transmission, Inc., 163 FERC ¶ 61,128 (2018) (order denying rehearing); see also
155 FERC ¶ 61,106 (Apr. 28, 2016) (decided prior to Chatterjee being appointed as a commissioner).
223. 163 FERC paras. 61-3; see also Dominion Transmission, Inc., 155 FERC ¶ 61,106 (2016)
(order issuing certificate).
224.

Id. para. 18.

225.

Id. paras. 18-19.

226.

Id. para. 28.

227.

See generally Dominion Transmission, Inc., 163 FERC ¶ 61,128, paras. 30-44 (2018).

228.

Id.

229. Of course, “[c]ourts have found that combustion emissions are an indirect effect of an agency’s decision to extract . . . natural resources,” Wilderness Workshop v. BLM., 342 F. Supp. 3d 1145,
1155 (D. Colo. 2018), and little difference exists between a decision to allow leasing of natural gas and a
decision to approve the ability to transport that gas. See also Wildearth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F.
Supp. 3d 41, 66-68 (D.D.C. 2019). One difficulty is distinguishing in a GHG analysis between indirect
and cumulative effects. See Citizens for a Healthy Cmty. v. BLM, 377 F. Supp. 3d 1223 (D. Colo.
2019); San Juan Citizens All. v. BLM, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D.N.M. 2018).
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230

tive. It then went further and rejected examining cumulative effects of increased
231
GHG emissions unless those effects are “reasonably foreseeable.” In a wordy
analysis, crabbed by FERC’s narrow focus on a defined geographic area, the Commission indicated it lacked sufficient information to examine either productionrelated or downstream impacts. “[I]f,” the Commission reasoned, it “does not have
meaningful information about future power plants, storage facilities, or distribution networks, within the geographic scope of a project-affected resource, then
these impacts are not reasonably foreseeable for inclusion in the cumulative im232
pacts analysis.” On rehearing, the Commission reiterated it would no longer engage in an upstream and downstream analysis, as it had previously, under the ru233
bric of providing at least upper-bound estimates of what those impacts might be.
234
Commissioners LaFleur and Glick registered strong objections. Both expressed dismay at the Commission’s departure from its recent practice, particularly
so soon after it issued its pipeline certificate policy notice of inquiry. And both
questioned the Commission’s reasoning that indirect downstream impacts are not
reasonably foreseeable and causally related to the Commission’s decisions. Commissioner Glick forcefully chastised the Commission for violating NEPA and the
NGA’s public interest standard, as well as attempting to shield itself from examining indirect effects by not asking pipeline applicants for the relevant infor235
mation.
Other recent orders follow this typical pattern: abdication by the Commis236
sion’s Republican members and objections by their Democratic colleagues. Most

230. Dominion Transmission, Inc., 163 FERC ¶ 61,128, para. 41 (2018); cf. Wildearth Guardians
v. BLM, 870 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2017) (rejecting the agency’s failure to examine GHG emissions because of alleged availability of substitute coal).
231.

Dominion Transmission, Inc., 163 FERC ¶ 61,128, paras. 30-44 (2018).

232. Id. para. 34. In paragraphs 37 through 42 of its Order, the Commission justified limiting the
geographic scope of its analysis, reasoning that, for upstream effects, “the magnitude of analysis requested by Otsego bears no relationship to the limited magnitude of the New Market Project’s 65.4
acres for operation of the facilities” and the Commission lacks sufficient “information regarding the
number, location, and timing of wells, roads, gathering lines, and other appurtenant facilities, as well as
details about production methods.” And for downstream effects, “nothing in the record . . . identifies
any specific end use or new incremental load downstream of the New Market Project, much less an end
use or new incremental load within the geographic area of where the impacts from the New Market
Project will be felt.” Id. paras. 37-39.
233. Id. paras. 55-70. The Commission, however, indicated that it would “continue to analyze
upstream and downstream environmental effects when those effects are sufficiently causally connected
to and are reasonably foreseeable effects of the proposed action, as contemplated by CEQ’s regulations.” Id. para. 44.
234.

163 FERC ¶ 61,128 (LaFleur, Comm’r, dissenting in part) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting).

235.

Id. (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting).

236. The Commission’s MVP Order also discussed analyzing GHG emissions. Mountain Valley
Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, paras. 287-296 (2017). It rejected using a social cost of carbon for
individual pipeline review, id. para. 296, which it did in its DTE Order as well. DTE Midstream Appalachia, LLC, 162 FERC ¶ 61,238, paras. 72-82 (2018). The environmental analysis in the DTE Order
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vocal remains Commissioner Glick, who registers objections to the Commission’s
237
failure to consider GHG emissions under both the NGA and NEPA. In response, Commissioner McNamee claims the Commission lacks the authority to
engage in the climate change debate—a perspective one writer posits is “align[ed]
with the conservative legal philosophy of the Federalist Society and FERC general
counsel James Dany [now Commissioner], who espouses the theory of the ‘humble
238
regulator,’ wherein interpreting the law to make policy is to be avoided.”
FERC’s approach is largely unsustainable under NEPA. Federal courts routinely demand that agencies adequately examine the indirect and cumulative effects
from increased GHG emissions, and NEPA documents today invariably include an
239
analysis of GHG emissions, albeit often an insufficient one. A report by the Institute for Policy Integrity explains why NEPA requires examining the reasonably
foreseeable direct and indirect upstream and downstream effects of a project, along
with a robust alternatives analysis that includes a no additional natural gas op240
tion.
FERC initially could be optimistic when the D.C. Circuit rejected petitions
for review in two cases alleging an insufficient analysis of increasing natural gas
consumption. The court accepted FERC’s argument that an insufficient causal

similarly avoided meaningful discussion: FERC claimed it lacked the ability to determine the incremental impact and thus whether any impact was significant. And it rejected the suggestion that a sufficient
causal relationship existed between pipeline approval and upstream GHG emission impacts. Id. para.
52.
237. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., 169 FERC ¶ 61,051 (2019) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting); Nat.
Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 169 FERC ¶ 61,050 (2019) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting); Gulf LNG Liquefaction Co., 168 FERC ¶ 61,020 (2019) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting); Mountain Valley Pipeline, 163
FERC ¶ 61,197 (2018) (LaFleur, Comm’r, dissenting) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting) (order on reh’g). At
a conference, Commissioner Glick opined he was against scrubbing climate change from the Commission’s orders. Edward Klump, Glick on Pipelines, Electricity, and the Climate ‘Scrub’, E&E NEWS (Sept. 27,
2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/09/27/stories/1061174425.
238. Rod Kuckro, McNamee, Glick Clash Over Climate, E&E NEWS (July 19, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/07/19/stories/1060757919.
239. E.g., Wildearth Guardians v. BLM, 870 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2017); San Juan Citizens All.
v. BLM, 2018 WL 2994406 (D.N.M. 2018); AquaAlliance v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 287 F. Supp.
3d 969, 1032 (E.D. Cal. 2018); High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 2018 WL
3804099 (D. Colo. 2018); W. Org. of Res. Councils v. BLM, 2018 WL 1475470 (D. Mont. 2018);
Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Office of Surface Mining, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (D. Mont. 2017),
amended in part, affirmed in part, 2017 WL 5047901 (D. Mont. 2017); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.
BLM, 2017 WL 3667700 (D. Nev. 2017); see generally Michael Berger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and
Upstream Emissions Analysis: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109 (2017);
Arnold W. Reitze, Dealing with Climate Change Under the National Environmental Policy Act (University
of Utah College of Law Research Paper No. 320, 2019). But cf. James W. Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline
Wars: Reforming Environmental Assessment of Energy Transport Infrastructure, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 119, 15052, 162-63 (2018) (questioning need for upstream and downstream analyses).
240. JAYNI HEIN, JASON SCHWARTZ & AVI ZEVIN, PIPELINE APPROVALS AND GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS 12-19 (2019), https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Pipeline_Approvals_
and_GHG_Emissions.pdf.
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connection existed between its decision authorizing the redesign of an LNG facility
in the Gulf Coast and the effects from consuming the exported gas in another
241
country—when the decision to allow the export rested with DOE. The court also dismissed petitioner’s claim that the LNG facility would induce more natural
gas production downstream by accepting that “[t]he Commission reasonably explained that the asserted linkage was too attenuated to be weighed in its particular
242
NEPA analysis.”
But recent pipeline opinions suggest such an analysis is not too attenuated. In
Sierra Club v. FERC, the D.C. Circuit Court disagreed with FERC’s order that the
downstream GHG effects from burning the transported gas was not reasonably
243
foreseeable. In remanding FERC’s order, the court also asked the Commission
to address whether it continued to believe that using a Social Cost of Carbon
244
(SCC) for pipeline decisions was unnecessary. On remand, the Commission reinstated the certificate after it accepted a supplemental EIS, concluding that it
could not assess whether the downstream GHG emissions are significant and, con245
sequently, retained its prior analysis. Responding to the court’s invitation to address again the efficacy of using an SCC, the Commission further reaffirmed its
judgment that SCC is not a productive tool for project level pipeline decisions,
primarily because it is not engaged in regional planning for either production or
246
consumption.
FERC shortly thereafter prevailed—but realistically lost—its next major case.
In Birckhead v. FERC, the court affirmed FERC’s failure to consider as indirect
247
effects either the upstream or downstream GHG impacts. Notably, though, the
court quoted counsel’s oral argument that “there may well be instances in which
upstream gas production is both reasonably foreseeable and sufficiently causally
248
connected to a pipeline project to qualify as an indirect effect.” Here, however,
the court accepted the Commission’s judgment that the record lacked sufficient
evidence that the particular pipeline was the only way to move the gas in the market (a record lacking information because the question was never asked of the ap-

241. Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also Sierra Club v. FERC, 672 Fed.
App’x 38 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Mem.) (following Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d 36).
242. Sierra Club, 827 F.3d at 47; see also Sierra Club v. FERC, 672 Fed. App’x 38 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (companion case, with same judgment). In EarthReports, Inc. v. FERC, 828 F.3d 949 (D.C. Cir.
2016), the court again relied on Sierra Club, 827 F.3d 59, to reject requiring additional analysis of upstream (GHG emissions) and downstream effects (induced production from the Marcellus shale region)
from FERC’s decision authoring changes to the Cove Point LNG facility. The court also accepted
Commission’s decision not to use the SCC. EarthReports, 828 F.3d at 956.
243.

Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

244.

Id. at 1375.

245.

Florida Southeast Connection, LLC, 162 FERC ¶ 61,233 (2018).

246.

Id.

247.

Birckhead v. FERC, 925 F.3d 510, 517 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Broad Run Project).

248.

Id.
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plicant). The court distinguished Sierra Club by explaining how in that circumstance the destination and use of the natural gas was known—and here they “re249
main a mystery.” The court implicitly chastised the Commission for failing to
obtain that missing information and, while upholding FERC’s decision, strongly
intimated that the Commission must examine downstream GHG emission effects
250
from natural gas combustion.
FERC Commissioners are now divided in a battle over how to address GHG
emissions in pipeline orders. But it seems highly likely after Birckhead that such an
analysis will be required, rather than be allowed to remain shrouded in “mystery”
251
and avoided. Indeed, in a more recent per curiam opinion for the Atlantic Sunrise
Project, the D.C. Circuit invoked Sierra Club, reasoning that “customers’ burning
of the natural gas that the Project transports will produce greenhouse-gas emissions . . . [and petitioners] are also correct that NEPA required the Commission to
consider both the direct and indirect environmental effects of the Project, and that,
despite what the Commission argues, the downstream greenhouse-gas emissions
252
are just such an indirect effect.”

D. FERC’s Gas Pipeline Policy Notice of Inquiry
With all this turmoil, the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry in April
2018, soliciting comments on its policies for certificating new natural gas transpor253
254
tation facilities. The agency’s existing policies date back almost two decades,
and the dramatic changes in the industry and markets since then prompted
FERC’s interest in exploring possible changes to its regulatory program. The existing policy reflects decades of practice where the Commission “adopted an economic balancing test that weighs the public benefits of a project against its adverse im-

249.

Id. at 518.

250.

Id. at 519-20.

251. The D.C. Circuit recently avoided the question in the challenge to the New Market Project,
when several states and the District of Columbia urged the court “to recognize the straightforward principle . . . that projects intended to increase the supply and transportation of natural gas also increase the
amount of natural gas produced and consumed, with resulting environmental impacts, including [GHG]
emissions that contribute to climate change.” Brief for New York et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 8-9, Otsego 2000 v. FERC, 767 F. App’x 19 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 12, 2018) (No. 18-1188); see
Ostego 2000 v. FERC, 767 F. App’x 19 (D.C. Cir. May 9, 2019); see generally Pamela King, D.C. Circuit
Won’t
Revisit
FERC
Climate
Battle,
E&E
NEWS
(July
23,
2019),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060775337.
252. Allegheny Def. Project v. FERC, 932 F.3d 940, 945-46 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 943 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 5, 2019).
253. Notice of Inquiry, Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Facilities, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,020
(April 25, 2018), 163 FERC ¶ 61,042 (2018) (notice of inquiry).
254. Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities, 88 FERC ¶ 61,277 (1999),
clarified, 90 FERC ¶ 61,128 (2000), further clarified, 92 FERC ¶ 61,094 (2000).
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255

pacts.” Benefits are then measured by market demand, illustrated by commit256
ments established in either contracts or precedent agreements. And FERC’s policy is principally designed to protect existing customers against cross-subsidization
257
by allocating the risk of new construction on the pipeline and its shareholders.
Shortly after becoming Chairman, now former Charmain Kevin McIntyre announced it was time to take a “fresh look” and examine the “really hard ques258
tions.” Those “hard” questions elicited over 25,000 comments from interested
259
stakeholders. A host of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) urged the
Commission to review its approach for examining upstream and downstream
GHG emission effects, and emphasized the importance of a more robust analysis
of project need rather than relying almost exclusively on whether and how prece260
dent agreements establish a need for natural gas. Several state attorneys general
similarly urged a wider consideration of the public interest that meaningfully explores market need over merely accepting precedent agreements, as well as examin261
ing the upstream and downstream GHG emission effects. They also expressed
concern with the approach toward eminent domain and how the Commission’s use
262
of conditional certificates affects a state’s authority to implement CWA § 401.
The industry, conversely, generally defended the Commission’s existing Certificate
263
Policy and use of precedent agreements. And EPA informed the Commission on
264
available tools for reviewing upstream and downstream GHG emission impacts.

255.

Christin, supra note 65, at 116.

256.

Id. at 117; see also infra note 268 and accompanying text.

257. See Christin, supra note 65, at 124, 128. “Instead of picking winners and losers,” it does this
by “evaluat[ing] the public convenience and necessity of pipeline construction projects based on the
demonstrated willingness of investors to risk capital in the market place.” Id. at 132.
258. Rod Kuckro & Jenny Mandel, FERC Tackles First Gas Policy Review Since 1999, E&E NEWS
(Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060079613.
259. See Ellen M. Gilmer, Sam Mintz & Rod Kuckro, Commenters Swarm FERC to Push Reform—
and Status Quo, E&E NEWS (July 27, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2018/07/27/
stories/1060091321.
260. Public Interest Organizations, Comment Letter on Certification of Interstate Natural Gas
Facilities, Docket No. PL18-1-000 (July 25, 2018).
261. Attorneys General of Massachusetts, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Washington, and the District of Columbia, Comment Letter on Certification of Interstate Natural Gas Facilities, Docket No. PL18-1-000 (July 25, 2018).
262.

Id.

263. See Natural Gas Council, Comment Letter on Certification of Interstate Natural Gas Facilities, Docket No. PL18-1-000 (July 25, 2018); Iroquois Gas Transmission System, L.P., Comment Letter
on Certification of Interstate Natural Gas Facilities, Docket No. PL18-1-000 (July 25, 2018); Interstate
Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA), Comment Letter on Certification of Interstate Natural
Gas Facilities, Docket No. PL18-1-000 (July 25, 2018). INGAA’s comments exceed 100 pages and defend the existing certification policy.
264. Sam Mintz, EPA Advises FERC on Measuring Greenhouse Gases, E&E NEWS (June 22, 2018),
https://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2018/06/22/stories/1060086219. EPA had earlier objected to FERC
NEPA documents that ignored indirect effects from downstream natural gas combustion. E.g., Letter
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IV. EMBEDDED INFRASTRUCTURE AND POSSIBLY TOO MUCH GAS
The shift away from coal-fired electric generation, coupled with changes in
265
our transportation fuels, can reduce U.S. GHG emissions, but what happens to
natural gas as the U.S. moves toward the necessity of a carbon-free economy?
Moving forward, consequently, this last section proffers some suggestions. At
the outset, topical issues such as pipeline safety and better coordination between
PHMSA and FERC on siting of natural gas lines can be resolved, along with more
266
careful attention by PHMSA toward plugging safety gaps. And conversations
surrounding environmental compliance with the construction of new interstate
natural gas pipelines must be taken seriously—and we should acknowledge rather
than question the states’ important role in administering state water quality programs. FERC too should take seriously landowner concerns with the present eminent domain process for interstate natural gas pipelines—and it appears likely that
267
the D.C. Circuit will dictate that it does so. More fundamentally, FERC must,
under NEPA and the NGA, acknowledge its role in exploring the GHG emissions
associated with new interstate natural gas pipelines. Accordingly, the Commission
must further explore the market need over time for natural gas, to avoid a potential
stranded asset problem.
To begin with, the debate in a few states surrounding § 401 of the CWA appears likely to remain a peripheral issue. Little suggests that states like New York
are abusing their authority, but instead raising relevant issues tied to protecting
water quality. Unless the Supreme Court weighs in and concludes that states do
not waive their § 401 authority when extending the time for action by requiring a
withdrawal and resubmittal of an application, it seems likely that outright denials
of certification will follow, prompting pipeline applicants to adjust their behavior.
One option promoted by Alex Klass and Jim Rossi would be to involve the state
268
earlier in the pre-filing stages of the pipeline certification process.

from Kenneth A. Westlake, Chief, NEPA Implementation Section, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, EPA, to Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary, FERC, Oct. 11, 2016 (on file with author)
(“We view FERC’s response to our comments as very concerning in light of CEQ’s GHG Guidance
and request a headquarters level meeting with us to seek a definitive resolution to this matter before
you publish a Record of Decision (ROD) and so that you do not continue to take this approach in additional NEPA documents.”).
265. Energy related CO2 rose in 2018 as a result of a warmer than normal summer and colder
than normal winter, but EIA expects it will decrease in 2019 as temperatures normalize and more natural gas and renewables are deployed. EIA, SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK (Apr. 2019).
266. See Gosman, supra note 140. The two agencies have negotiated agreements involving
PHMSA’s ability to issue letters of determination regarding safety for LNG facilities. FERC, Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Transportation and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Regarding Liquefied Natural Gas Transportation Facilities (Aug. 31, 2018).
267.

See supra Section III.B.

268. Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Reconstituting the Federalism Battle in Energy Transportation,
41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 480-81 (2017).
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Next, FERC ought to consider remedying the difficulties confronting land269
owners intervening in the FERC process, and possibly preventing the transfer
of property interests until a § 7 certificate is “effective.” The Commission’s dis270
claimer that the NGA and the judiciary hold all the cards is tautological —both
the NGA and the judiciary are subservient to FERC’s decision to award a certificate. The Commission commensurately enjoys capacious authority to determine
whether, when, and how a certificate can be considered “effective” for purposes of
§ 7(h). Indeed, the Commission relies on its discretionary authority to even issue
271
conditional certificates. New York, for instance, urges abandoning conditional
272
certificates as one solution for landowners. Yet FERC, instead, could clarify that
a certificate ought to become “effective” for purposes of eminent domain only
when all required federal clearances or permits have been obtained. A pipeline
company could commence other work, with voluntary agreements to access property, or begin construction on property it owns or controls, but the federal right of
eminent domain would not become operative until a certificate is “effective.”
Many pipeline projects have tight construction schedules (often set by FERC and
273
in precedent agreements with shippers), which contribute toward to the need for
269. This might include FERC reversing its recent policy of becoming less lenient on late interventions. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 162 FERC ¶ 61,167, para. 50 (“we will be less lenient in the grant
of late interventions”); see also DTE Midstream Appalachia, LLC, 162 FERC ¶ 61,238, at paras. 8-12
(2018) (same). FERC also could explore ways to avoid the trap some litigants confront when they fail
to appreciate the significance of raising issues during a proceeding, and then preserving issues by seeking rehearing before proceeding to judicial review. See Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 163 FERC ¶
61,197, at paras. 15-19 (2018) (order on reh’g) (explaining consequences); Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC,
164 FERC ¶ 61,100, at para. 12 (2018) (untimely rehearing, and not preserving issues); see also Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty. v. FERC, 783 F.3d 1301, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (rejecting a challenge
to the absence of precedent agreements because issue was only presented in a footnote on rehearing).
Another improvement might be to ensure that intervenors appreciate how, if they wish, to get access to
confidential precedent agreements. Id. at 13 (noting ways to get access to some privileged and confidential documents). See Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 164 FERC ¶ 61,100 at paras. 15-25 (discussing access
to precedent agreements). Since I first drafted this article, the Commission has initiated limited efforts
to address some landowner concerns. See Niina H. Farah, FERC Vows Rapid Responses in Eminent Domain Legal Brawl, E&E NEWS (Feb. 11, 2020); https://www.eenews.net/energywire/
2020/02/11/stories/1062319101; Jeremy Dillion, FERC Reorganizes to Address Landowner Disputes, E&E
NEWS (Feb. 3, 2020) https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2020/02/03/stories/1062254577.
270.

See supra notes 201-08 and accompanying text.

271.

See Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,197, at paras. 80-83.

272. Attorney General of the State of New York, Comment Letter on Certification of Interstate
Natural Gas Facilities, Docket No. PL18-1-000 (arguing against conditional certificates).
273. One court observed, when granting summary judgment, that “[c]onstruction timing is critical, and construction delays will result in lost contracts, the inability to comply with FERC requirements, and substantial financial losses that cannot be recouped.” Penneast Pipeline Co. v. Permanent
Easement of 0.06 Acres in Moore Twn., 2019 WL 4447981 *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2019). Shippers may
be loath to sign precedent agreements extending too long the period they will commit. In a FERC proceeding, such as with the MVP, participants will know the identity of the shippers, the maximum daily
quantity, as well as the contractual terms. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, at paras. 9-10.
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conditional certificates in the first place. A reasonable middle ground, therefore,
might allow a certificate applicant to satisfy the terms of its reformulated precedent agreements without risking inappropriately condemning property. Or, conversely, judges could exercise equitable power and reject preliminary injunction
274
motions to obtain quick access to property.
Finally, agencies can take seriously their obligation under NEPA as well as
their organic acts, whether the NGA, the MLA, or FLPMA to ensure that all environmental and natural resource issues are thoroughly vetted. The obligation includes analyzing the full life-cycle GHG emissions both upstream and downstream
275
from allowing the construction of a new natural gas pipeline. When necessary or
where appropriate, agencies can respond by avoiding, mitigating, or minimizing
any adverse effects on the climate, landscape, natural resources, and indigenous
276
populations. The notion that GHG emissions are somewhat beyond the ken of
the NGA’s “public interest” mandate is dubious. Section 7 of the NGA vests the
Commission with broad authority, including the ability to “condition certificates in
277
such manner as the public convenience and necessity may require.” Romany
Webb’s analysis for the Sabin Center aptly demonstrates why NGA § 7 not only
278
authorizes but prescribes a sufficient environmental analysis. Similarly, Harvard’s Electricity Law Initiative summarizes the historical understanding surrounding “public convenience and necessity” to explain why the Commission ought to
amend its Certificate Policy Statement to ensure a full accounting of the “economic risks and environmental harms of downstream and upstream [GHG] emissions
279
in a certificate proceeding.” And several U.S. Senators responded to FERC’s

274. See Pamela King, Federal Judge Rejects Md. Eminent Domain Bid, E&E NEWS (Aug. 22,
2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1061025035. The Fourth Circuit may soon decide
whether the court enjoys such equitable power. See Niina H. Farah, Developer Fights Eminent Domain
Denial in Md., E&E NEWS (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061160131.
275. See supra notes 238-46 and accompanying text. This same problem surfaces with electric
transmission lines, when agencies occasionally avoid meaningful analysis. See Nat’l Parks Conservation
Ass’n v. Semonite, 925 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (court having to address pipeline construction already undertaken without adequate NEPA compliance).
276. Commission staff today generally actively monitor pipeline construction and environmental
compliance. E.g., FERC Field Inspection Report, July 11, 2019 (for DTE Midstream Appalachia Birdsboro Pipeline Project), Issuance No. 20190726-3001, available on FERC’s E-Library, Docket No. CP17458-000.
277. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 360 U.S. 378, 391 (1959); see also Fed.
Power Comm’n v. Transcon. Gas Pipeline Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 7 (1961) (broad discretionary authority);
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). New proceedings under § 7 arguably
afford FERC broader authority than rate proceedings under §§ 4 and 5 for existing jurisdictional facilities. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1988).
278. ROMANY M. WEBB, CLIMATE CHANGE, FERC, AND NATURAL GAS PIPELINES: THE
LEGAL BASIS FOR CONSIDERING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE
NATURAL GAS ACT (2019).
279. Harvard Electricity Law Initiative, Comment Letter on Certification of New Interstate
Natural Gas Facilities, Docket No. PL18-1-000 (July 25, 2018). Another study reviewed this history and
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solicitation regarding its Certificate Policy by explaining why FERC ought to em280
ploy an SCC in its review of pipeline applications.
As described above, FERC should consider the environmental impacts of both
upstream and downstream emissions when deciding whether to grant a § 7 certifi281
cate. But while such consideration is surely required and necessary, it is still
woefully insufficient. Though not as devastating as coal-fired generation, natural
gas-fired generation too is inimical to the long-term health of the planet. Pipeline
infrastructure projects precipitate the urgency of addressing whether natural gas
(a) should remain part of our energy economy at least through 2050; or (b) should
only serve as a bridge fuel, and if so, for how long? It requires careful consideration
of the environmental, economic, and technical feasibility of decarbonizing our energy economy between now and 2050. We also must determine whether, with the
loss of coal-fired generation, the country has the renewable generation capacity—
with battery storage assumed—and transmission capacity to satisfy the projected
electric demand if we avoid constructing many of these pipelines. Ideally, we
should answer these questions before society either: a) invests billions in infrastructure that might become stranded assets; or b) unduly tilts future decisions toward a continuation of natural gas when it is no longer necessary. Of course, we
could instead assume this infrastructure might become a stranded asset and plan
accordingly.
While it is well beyond the capacity of this article to examine the role of natural gas and answer either “a” or “b,” we presently lack an effective institutional
mechanism for having the conversation. Predictive models can inform how much
natural gas we have consumed and are likely to need over the next several years
282
(and possibly decades, though with much less certainty). In 2016, natural gas
283
consumption in the U.S. hovered around 75 billion cubic feet per day. That
number rose to about 82.1 billion cubic feet per day by 2018, and could increase to
284
84.6 in 2019, before remaining flat in 2020. An April 2019 study by the Boston
confirms that “courts have allowed the Commission significant freedom to decide under what circumstances it should issue a certificate for pipeline construction.” Christin, supra note 65, at 120. In Minisink
Residents for Envtl. Pres. & Safety v. FERC, 762 F.3d 97, 107 (D.C. Cir. 2014), the court agreed with
petitioners “that the Commission was obligated to consider, as part of its certificating process under the
NGA, reasonable alternatives to the [proposed] project.” Admittedly, the issue there and the alleged
inconsistency with City of Pittsburgh v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956) involved
FERC’s treatment of future expansion, but the court emphasized the Commission’s “wide discretion.”
Minisink, 762 F.2d at 107-09, 111.
280. Hon. Sheldon Whitehouse, et al., Comment Letter on Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Facilities, Docket No. PL18-1-000 (July 25, 2018). I agree that FERC ought to employ an
SCC, but its utility only becomes meaningful if costs and benefits are considered on a macro level.
281.

See supra Section III.C.

282.

See NORDHAUS & KALEN, supra note 29, at 226-27.

283.

See NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, MACROECONOMICS OUTCOMES OF MARKET
DETERMINED LEVELS OF U.S. LNG EXPORTS 22 (2018).
284.

EIA, supra note 264 (Short-Term Energy Outlook).
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Consulting Group suggests that natural gas demand could taper off, with supply
285
exceeding demand, starting around 2020. But even predicting a year out requires
appreciating the role of natural gas pricing for the power sector, weather events
affecting residential and commercial use, and how the broader economic outlook
286
will drive industrial use of natural gas.
These variables seem to push the industry toward short-term decisions on
pipeline infrastructure. As of 2015, the nation had roughly 2.6 million miles of
287
pipelines, as well as 414 natural gas storage facilities. Since 2016, FERC has ap288
proved annually between 30 and 40 pipeline projects. With a typical recourse
289
rate of return on capital for new projects at 14%, investment makes sense. And
the D.C. Circuit has indicated it is “ill-equipped to second guess the Commission’s
expert judgment that 14% ROE with 50/50 equity/debt capital structure” is war290
ranted. If, however, delays and uncertainties occur in the approval process, that
investment incentive lessens, and smaller projects in particular might be aban-

285.

ALEX DEWAR, DAVID GEE & TOM BAKER, BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, PREPARING
(Apr. 2019); see Edward Klump, Climate, Clean Tech Could
Curb Demand for U.S. Gas-Study, E&E NEWS, Apr. 15, 2019.

FOR AN ABUNDANCE OF US NATURAL GAS

286.

EIA, supra note 264 (Short-Term Energy Outlook).

287. QER-1, supra note 94, at S-2. The Energy Department concluded that roughly half of the
nation’s pipelines had been constructed in the 1950s and 1960s, suggesting that future investment would
“range between $2.6 billion and $3.5 billion per year between 2015 and 2030, depending on the overall
level of natural gas demand.” Id. at S-5.
288. See Rod Kuckro, Dominion Cancels Gas Pipeline, Blames FERC, E&E NEWS (July 1, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060678703.
289. For instance, the MVP proposed a capital structure of 60% capital investment, or equity,
and 40% debt—at a 6% debt cost and a return on equity (ROE) of 14%, with a weighted average cost of
capital at 10.8%. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, paras. 79-84 (2017). The Commission responded that its 14% ROE policy applies “only where the equity component of the capitalization is no more than 50%.” Id. This is because equity financing costs ratepayers more money: it is more
costly than debt financing and debt financing is tax deductible. Id. at para. 80 (noting Commission’s
policy in Fla. Se. Connection, LLC, 154 FERC ¶ 61,080 (2016) (order on reh’g), 165 FERC ¶ 61,160
(2016) (vacated and remanded sub nom)); Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1257). Yet, for the MVP,
FERC noted how a 14% recourse ROE would sufficiently incent new market entrants such as the MVP,
provided MVP alters its debt/equity ratio. Id. at paras 82-84. A recourse rate establishes a likely ceiling,
with shippers capable of negotiating a slightly lower rate. It ostensibly avoids a company from overexercising market power. See N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. FERC, 761 Fed. App’x 9 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 3, 2019)
(challenging recourse rate, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). FERC further requires that the company
file a rate study within 3 years, e.g., Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043 para. 83
(2017), at which point FERC might initiative a § 5 rate proceeding (unlikely) or the company could
submit a § 4 rate change (again unlikely). The Commission appears reticent to change rates even when
they may beyond an established zone of reasonableness. E.g., Wy. Interstate Co., 169 FERC ¶ 61,052
(2019) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting) (questioning FERC’s decision not to change rates even though federal tax changes and a Commissioner order suggested rates should be lowered). Although a typical reasonable rate affords a 10.55% ROE at a hypothetical capital structure of 57/43 equity/debt, rates often
are part of a “black box” process. FERC, Rate Changes Relating to Federal Income Tax Rate, 84 Fed.
Reg. 17,739, 17,744 (Apr. 26, 2019).
290.

City of Oberlin v. FERC, 937 F.3d 599, 610 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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doned. For example, Dominion Energy recently announced it was abandoning the
Sweden Valley Project, a 5-mile, $48 million project that would have delivered gas
291
to Ohio.
Admittedly, the current Commission evinces little temperament for engaging
292
in a longer-term analysis. Its Certificate Policy Statement, now under review, is
designed to elicit information that will allow the Commission to balance the “public benefits against the potential adverse consequences,” while affording “appropriate consideration to the enhancement of competitive transportation alternatives,
the possibility of overbuilding, subsidization by existing customers, the applicant’s
responsibility for unsubscribed capacity, the avoidance of unnecessary disruptions
of the environment, and the unneeded exercise of eminent domain in evaluating
293
new pipeline construction.” But the policy sits on the shoulders of the Commission’s assumption that precedent agreements (or similar commitment agreements)
294
reflect public benefits by establishing a market need. The Certificate Policy even
acknowledges that transactions involving affiliated entities raise questions—albeit
295
questions not examined by the Commission. The Policy further acknowledges
that speculative projects ought to have more evidence of need, but little suggests
296
any robust inquiry to avoid these issues. A cardinal objective, rather, appears to
297
be ensuring that existing customers are not saddled with additional costs.
FERC’s approach for establishing market need—a corollary for concluding a project serves the public convenience and necessity—is then reviewed deferentially by
298
the courts.
Although former Commissioner Norman Bay expressed a willingness to ex299
plore market need more meaningfully, the Commission currently has elected

291. Rod Kuckro, Dominion Cancels Gas Pipeline, Blames FERC, E&E NEWS (July 1, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060678703. Dominion’s letter to FERC indicated its agreements required an in-service firm transportation service date of November 1, 2019, which meant receiving at the
latest its FERC certificate by November 10, 2018, which had not even been granted as of the date of
Dominion’s letter. Mathew R. Bley, Dominion Energy, Letter to FERC, June 28, 2019.
292.
293.
(2018).
294.

See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043 (2017), on reh’g 163 FERC ¶ 61,197
See infra note 301 and accompanying text.

295. Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities, 88 FERC ¶ 61,227 (1999)
(Certificate Policy Statement), clarified, 90 FERC ¶ 61,128, further clarified, 92 FERC ¶ 61,094 (2000).
The earlier more stringent policy required firm commitments for at least 25% of the pipeline’s capacity.
88 FERC, ¶ 61,743; see also Christin, supra note 65, at 124-26 (discussing historical and current policy).
296.
(2000).
297.

88 FERC ¶ 61,227 (1999), clarified, 90 FERC ¶ 61,128, further clarified, 92 FERC ¶ 61,094
See supra note 256 and accompanying text.

298.
2015).

E.g., Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty. v. FERC, 783 F.3d 1301, 1311-15 (D.C. Cir.

299.
(2017).

See Separate Statement, National Fuel Gas Supply Corp., 158 FERC ¶ 61,145, paras. 2-3
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otherwise. The Commission’s tendency to avoid any principled inquiry into market
need became pronounced in the MVP proceeding. Opponents argued that other
projects already provided sufficient capacity, and approval of the MVP would re300
sult in over-building. MVP conversely furnished a Wood Mackenzie Study suggesting that natural gas demand would “reach 8.3 billion cubic feet (Bcf) per day
by 2030,” that this gas would have to come from the Marcellus and Utica for301
mations and, consequently, “would require additional pipeline capacity.” The
Commission effectively avoided resolving this debate. Instead, it observed that
MVP offered precedent agreements for the pipeline’s full design capacity. That
302
sufficiently established market demand.
Indeed, the Commission expressly
opined it would not “examine the need for pipeline infrastructure on a region-wide
303
basis.” To do so would require examining uncertain trends in “economic growth,
the cost of natural gas, environmental regulations, and legislative and regulatory
304
decisions by the federal government and individual states.” State policies for
managing their “electric-power fuel source for the next 20 years” is equally too

300. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, paras. 34-43 (2017) (noting reports on
need: DOE, NATURAL GAS INFRASTRUCTURE IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED DEMAND FROM THE
ELECTOR SECTOR; SYNAPSE ENERGY ECONOMICS, INC. ARE THE ATLANTIC COAST PIPELINE AND
THE MOUNTAIN VALLEY PIPELINE NECESSARY? (2016); and INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY ECONOMICS
AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS, RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH NATURAL GAS EXPANSION IN APPALACHIA
(Apr. 2016)). For Mountain Valley’s pending proposed 74-mile MVP Southgate project (MVPSouthgate), a more recent Appalachian Voices funded study questioned the market demand in the
North Carolina/Virginia region. Andrew M. Ballard, Need for Mountain Valley Pipeline Extension Questioned, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Aug. 1, 2019), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-andenergy/need-for-mountain-valley-pipeline-extension-questioned.
301. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, para. 39 (2017) (footnotes omitted)
(referencing WOOD MACKENZIE, INC., SOUTHEAST U.S. NATURAL GAS MARKET DEMAND IN
SUPPORT OF THE MOUNTAIN VALLEY PIPELINE PROJECT (Jan. 2016)). Project opponents noted that
the Wood Mackenzie study “relies on data from an unusually cold winter and assumes gas will be flexible to meet the variable needs of generators.” Id.
302. Id. paras. 40-42 (albeit the Commission did take some “pot shots” at the studies). FERC
noted how it would not explore the prudence of end user decisions to obtain natural gas, rather state
regulators could assess a utility’s “ability to recover costs associated with its decision to subscribe for
service.” Id. para. 53. The D.C. Circuit accepts the use of precedent agreements for establishing market
demand. See Birckhead v. FERC, 925 F.3d 510, 517-18 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
303. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, para. 42 (2017). The Commission
echoed this point later, asserting that it has “no way to accurately predict the scale, timing, and location
of projects, much less the kind of facilities that will be proposed.” Id. paras. 138-40.
304. Id. para. 42. The Commission expressed little concern that the agreements may have been
with affiliated entities, provided there is no evidence of discrimination. Mountain Valley Pipeline,
LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,197, para. 36 (2018). See also Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶
61,043, at paras. 44-45 (2017) (declining to suggest the Commission should exercise additional scrutiny
with affiliated precedent agreement transactions, absent evidence of anticompetitive behavior or discrimination); Spire STL Pipeline LLC, 164 FERC ¶ 61,085, para. 24 (2018) (only one agreement and
that one with affiliated company for 87.5% of capacity, even when Missouri Public Service Commission
expressed concerns); see generally Christin, supra note 65, at 128 (defending why affiliated transactions
are unlikely to be shams).
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305

speculative. And it observed that the EIS for the project suggested that “renewable energy is not a comparable replacement for the transportation of natural
306
gas.”
The Commission, with one dissent, similarly approved the controversial 42inch, 600-mile, $7 billion Atlantic Coast Pipeline (ACP) with marginal analysis of
307
actual need for the natural gas. In authorizing the ACP to use Forest System
lands for the right-of-way, the Service observed that the project would “serve the
growing energy needs of multiple public utilities and local distribution companies
308
in Virginia and North Carolina.” The agency also considered President Trump’s
energy infrastructure executive orders and the need for timely approvals for such
309
projects. The Commission’s rehearing order rejected as untimely a party’s new
evidence questioning market need, reaffirming its practice to prohibit the introduction of new evidence at rehearing even if, as here, it may question the fundamental
310
viability of a project. The Fourth Circuit faulted several aspects of the project,
311
including faulty compliance with the ESA and inappropriate allowance of the
Forest Service rather than the National Park Service to decide whether a right-of312
way through the Appalachian Trial is permissible under the National Trails Act.
But perhaps more consequential is the muted treatment of market demand. ACP’s
owner “emphasized the project’s role in the transition from coal- to gas-fired pow313
er.” Yet some Virginia state legislators wrote FERC in July 2019 that recent filings by Dominion Energy suggest that natural gas demand had been overstated,
possibly risking having ratepayers shoulder some of the project’s large capital
314
costs. The lawmakers wrote that project demand, for then roughly $7.8 billion in

305. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, paras. 42-43 (2017). Elsewhere in its
opinion, the Commission invoked Chevron deference to suggest its approach toward awarding certificates is broad under a step two analysis. Id. para. 60 n. 79.
306.

Id. at 43.

307. See Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,042 (2017), 164 FERC ¶ 61,100 (2018)
(order on reh’g).
308. USDA FOREST SERVICE, RECORD OF DECISION ON THE ATLANTIC COAST PIPELINE
PROJECT SPECIAL USE PERMIT/LAND AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN AMENDMENTS, 17
(2017).
309.

Id. at 23.

310.

Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 164 FERC ¶61,100, paras. 17-19 (2018) (order on reh’g).

311. Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 931 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2019); Sierra
Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2018). The court subsequently invalidated a
state air permit. Friends of Buckingham v. State Air Pollution Control Bd., 947 F.3d 68 (4th Cir.
2020).
312. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 911 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. granted 140 S. Ct. 36 (Oct. 4, 2019) (Nos. 18-1854 & 1587).
313. Pamela King, Pipeline Backers Set Stage for Appalachian Trail Fight, E&E NEWS (June 26,
2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/06/26/stories/1060656847.
314. Jeremy Dillon, Va. Lawmakers Oppose Atlantic Coast Project, E&E NEWS (July 16, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2019/07/16/stories/1060748451.
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costs, entirely depended upon (96%) affiliated arrangements, and requested that
FERC “issue a stop work order and suspend the Certificate” pending a new de315
mand study.
If we wish to avoid crisscrossing the nation with possible stranded assets or
tethering us to a fossil fuel longer than necessary, some institutional mechanism
must be deployed to engage directly in the inquiry FERC ostensibly disclaims. As
the above case studies demonstrate, FERC is not meeting the challenge. Historically, the Federal Power Commission (FERC’s predecessor) examined national
316
energy needs to inform policy-level decisions. For hydroelectric development,
317
although largely irrelevant in modern hydroelectric relicensing proceedings,
318
Congress charged the Commission with examining regional planning. Every
year the Energy Information Administration provides both long-term and short319
term analyses of projected production and demand of energy resources. More
recently, the Energy Department engaged in infrastructure assessments—an in320
quiry FERC could have coordinated with DOE. When assessing the impact of
321
allowing LNG exports, DOE also performed several market-wide inquiries.
DOE earlier explored on a macro-level the nation’s transmission system and con322
straints and bottlenecks. DOE’s Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable En315. Letter from R. Creigh Deeds, Virginia State Senator, et al., to Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary
of FERC (July 11, 2019) (on file with publisher).
316. E.g., FPC, THE 1970 NATIONAL POWER SURVEY: A REPORT BY THE FEDERAL POWER
COMMISSION (1970); FPC, NATIONAL POWER SURVEY: A REPORT BY THE FEDERAL POWER
COMMISSION (1964). The 1970 report “serve[d] as a general long-range guide rather than a directive or
firm plan. It illustrates possible patterns of efficient development based upon assumptions outlined in
the report and with the passage of time, modifications to reflect variances from the assumptions will be
in order.” 1970 FPC REPORT, supra at I-iii. During the war, the Commission also compiled information
for future demand needs. Philip L. Cantelon, The Regulatory Dilemma of the Federal Power Commission,
1920-1977, 4 FED. HIST. J. 61, 69 (2012).
317. See generally Sam Kalen, Essay: Historical Flow of Hydroelectric Regulation: A Brief History, 53
IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2017).
318. See 16 U.S.C. § 797(a) (2006) (examining plans for the use of water resources on a regional
basis); 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1) (2006) (the Commission may give preference to an applicant’s plans that
are “best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways”); see
also 16 U.S.C. § 797(g) (2006) (the Commission also has the authority to examine “the public interest
to conserve and utilize the navigation and water-power resources of the region.”).
319.

See generally EIA, https://www.eia.gov.

320. See DOE Procedures for Conducting Electric Transmission Congestion Studies, 83 Fed.
Reg. 42,647 (Aug. 23, 2018); QER-1, supra note 94.
321. DOE Study on Macroeconomic Outcomes of LNG Exports, 83 Fed. Reg. 27,314, 27,315
(June 12, 2018) (describing five studies, and focusing on the 2018 macroeconomic study). A DOE commissioned study concluded, assuming no additional regulatory constraints on LNG exports, that the
United States would export roughly between 3.2 and 11.2 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year by 2040.
NERA, supra note 282, at 14.
322. DOE, NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY (2002) (submitted to the White House as
part of the National Energy Policy); National Transmission Grid Study 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 47,460
(Sept. 21, 2001).
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ergy (aided by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory) also has examined nec323
essary infrastructure for plug-in electric vehicles. When necessary, moreover,
FERC could always enlist the aid of another agency—the State Department, after
all, asked DOE to perform a critical analysis to assist the State Department’s deci324
sion on the Keystone XL oil pipeline. And notably, FERC staff issues reliability
reports, examining projected weather and grid capacity and reliability, as well as
projected natural gas prices—all factors FERC posits would be necessary to engage
325
in regional-wide planning.
When FERC or DOE anticipate the need to gather information or craft policies to adapt to market changes, they act. After all, without congressional directive,
326
FERC restructured both the natural gas and electric utility industries. FERC
and DOE, more indicatively, are working on how to better integrate natural gas
327
systems and the electric grid. Natural gas fired power plants require delivery of
the gas, and occasionally during cold weather when gas is diverted toward heating
328
needs or there is an emergency in the system, the power sector is short. Beginning around roughly 2012, as our energy portfolio shifted from coal toward natural
gas, the Commission began exploring barriers to effective coordination between
329
electric utilities and natural gas companies. DOE too has been working with the
natural gas pipeline industry to develop a computer model capable of assisting in
330
coordination of the electric grid with the gas industry and cybersecurity.

323.
2017).

DOE, NATIONAL PLUG-IN ELECTRIC VEHICLE INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS (Sept.

324.
(2012).

See Sam Kalen, Thirst for Oil and the Keystone XL Pipeline, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 21-22

325. FERC, SUMMER 2019 RELIABILITY AND ENERGY MARKET ASSESSMENT (2019); see also
FERC, WINTER 2018-19 ENERGY MARKET ASSESSMENT (Oct. 2018).
326.

See generally NORDHAUS & KALEN, supra note 29, at 54-97.

327. See, e.g., Order No. 809, Coordination of the Scheduling Processes of Interstate Natural Gas
Pipelines and Public Utilities, 151 FERC ¶ 61,049 (2015); see also Natalie Karas, Resilience Proceeding
Gives FERC a Chance to Advance Gas-Electric Coordination, EDF (May 9, 2018), http://blogs.edf.org/
energyexchange/2018/05/09/resilience-proceeding-gives-ferc-a-chance-to-advance-gas-electriccoordination/.
328. Jay Apt, Gerad Freeman & Michael Dworkin, The Natural Gas Grid Needs Better Monitoring,
34 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 4 (2018) (urging better reporting requirements).
329. Request for Comments of Commissioner Moeller on Coordination Between the Natural
Gas and Electricity Markets (Feb. 3, 2012), https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/electriccoord/moellergaselectricletter.pdf; Standards for Business Practices of Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines;
Coordination of the Scheduling Processes of Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines and Public Utilities, 153
FERC ¶ 61,061 (2016); Communication of Operational Information Between Natural Gas Pipelines
and Electric Transmission Operators, 145 FERC ¶ 61,134 (2013) (Order 787), 147 FERC ¶ 61,228
(2014) (order on reh’g) (Order No. 787-A).
330. Peter Behr & Jeremy Dillon, Electricity Chief on Gas, the Grid, and “Real-Time” Models, E&E
NEWS (July 25, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060784981. Electricity moves at the
speed of light, while natural gas travels at roughly a little over 20 mph; historically, natural gas operated
on daily cycle that started at 10:00am, while electric power generators used a 12 to 12 cycle. Such dis-
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The NGA’s obligation to consider the public convenience and necessity is
surely capacious enough to consider, as the Harvard Electricity Institute and Romany Webb note, project contributions toward climate change, but to support as well
331
any Commission policy of engaging in larger market studies. FERC, after all,
describes part of its mission as “[p]romot[ing] the development of safe, reliable,
332
and secure infrastructure that serves the public interest.” It recognizes that “the
nation’s energy infrastructure and energy markets must adapt” to the “significant
changes in energy supply,” such as “the increased availability of domestic natural
333
gas and the emergence and growth of new energy technologies.” It enjoys wide
discretion to consider “all factors bearing on the public interest,” whether the end
334
use of the gas or the effects of its decision. If, however, FERC eschews critically
examining market need, it cannot accomplish its mission. It cannot know whether
it is approving projects that serve the public interest today, or into the future as
new energy technologies emerge and grow.
This is evident in the Commission’s treatment of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline,
335
discussed earlier, as well as the proposed 65-mile interstate Spire STL Pipeline
Project (Spire), owned by a new pipeline market entrant with no existing customers. The only committed gas (87.5%) for the Spire project is a 20-year agreement
336
with Spire Missouri. Spire and Spire Missouri are wholly owned by the same
entity, Spire, Inc. Both Missouri River Transmission, an existing almost 700-mile
pipeline that would connect with Spire, as well as the Missouri Public Service
Commission, expressed concerns with the project. Furthermore, protesters are
concerned that “Spire’s proposed new pipeline is unneeded to meet what is de337
scribed as flat demand in the St. Louis metropolitan area.” Regardless of whether the protesters are correct, FERC shirked its obligation by deploying its Certificate Policy as a shield against any meaningful inquiry. The Commission explored

crepancies prompted examining daily schedules. See Coordination of the Scheduling Processes of Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines and Public Utilities, 151 FERC ¶ 61,049 (2015) (Order No. 809).
331. See supra note 277 and accompanying text. To date, the contrary argument rests almost entirely on the two cases discussed by Webb and the Harvard Electricity Institute. See NAACP v. Fed.
Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 669-70 (1976); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line, 365
U.S. 1, 7-8, 19-20, 30-31 (1961); see also James Costan, FERC Should Not Review Pipeline Downstream
Climate Impact, LAW360 (July 31, 2019), www.law360.com/articles/1183220.
332.

FERC, FISCAL YEAR 2018 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT i (2018).

333.

FERC, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2018-2022 v (2018).

334. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. at 7-8, 23. The Transcon Court carefully delineated
between the Commission’s wide discretion to consider all factors and its authority to regulate certain areas. The Court accepted the Commission’s consideration of end use of the gas as well as air pollution and
reversed the lower court’s (Consolidated Edison Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 271 F.3d 942 (3d Cir.
1959)) holding the Commission lacked power to consider conservation. Id. at 30-31.
335.

See supra notes 165, 299, and accompanying text.

336.

Spire STL Pipeline, LLC, 164 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2018).

337.

Id. para. 18; see also id. para. 49.

_JCI_KALEN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

370

7/2/2020 12:21 PM

[Vol. 9:2

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
338

Spire’s anticipated hypothetical cost of gas over a 20 year period, but it blandly
applied its Certificate Policy and accepted a singular precedent agreement with an
339
affiliated company without further inquiry. It rejected the need for any market
study, unless there is an affirmative showing of anti-competitive behavior or dis340
crimination. The Commission, moreover, disclaimed the appropriateness of ex341
amining market need in the alternatives analysis under NEPA. As intervenor
Environmental Defense Fund reported after FERC’s decision, “[t]he proceeding
reveals much about how the agency assesses the legally-required ‘market need’ for
new pipelines when both buyer and seller in the contract used to demonstrate that
market need are two different arms of the same company,” with the risk “that we
342
could end up with expensive new pipelines that aren’t needed.”
A significant barrier confronting any macro inquiry by FERC or any other institution on market need is the myriad of actors affecting our energy economy.
Some state or local governments remain in pitched battles over allowing any production, regulating well-spacing or fracking, prohibiting flaring, or, as in Colorado,
343
incorporating environmental considerations into new well approvals. Federal
land managing agencies, conversely, affect how much production can occur off the
nation’s public lands—often shifting with the political winds. Then, of course,
many pipeline facilities require some form of approval from more than FERC
344
alone, including the PHMSA (for safety), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
345
346
(for CWA permits), or the Bureau of Land Management (for rights of way).

338.

Id. para. 54.

339. Id. paras. 72-87. Because Spire Missouri is not a jurisdictional entity, no requirement existed
for an open season to solicit bids from prospective shippers.
340. Id. para. 81. It further added that “we believe that any attempt by the Commission to look
behind the precedent agreements in this proceeding might, in fact, interfere with the state regulators’
role in determining the prudence of expenditures by the utilities that they regulate.” Id. para. 87. This
was odd, given that the state regulator in the proceeding was asking for additional review.
341. Id. paras. 207-17. Dissenting, Commissioner Glick lamented that the Commission had given
the application an “anemic review” and “lends credence to the critique that the Commission does not
meaningfully review section 7 applications.” Spire STL Pipeline, LLC, 164 FERC ¶ 61,085, para. 1
(2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting).
342. Natalie Karas, FERC Approves Pipeline Despite Concern Over Controversial Business Arrangement, EDF (Aug. 10, 2018), http://blogs.edf.org/energyexchange/2018/08/10/ferc-approves-pipelinedespite-concern-over-controversial-business-arrangement/. Local farmers recently filed a complaint at
FERC alleging that the company is damaging their property and asked that FERC halt construction.
Mike Soraghan, Famers Press FERC to Block Pipeline Launch, E&E NEWS (Oct. 28, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/10/28/stories/1061394825. The Commission denied rehearing
Spire STL Pipeline LLC, 169 FERC ¶ 61,134 (2019), and the case is pending before the D.C. Circuit.
Mike Soraghan, FERC Approval of Gas Project Challenged in Court, E&E NEWS (Jan. 23, 2020),
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1062152537.
343.

See Tara Righetti, The Incidental Environmental Agency, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).

344.

See supra note 139.

345.

See supra note 143.

346.

See 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (1992).
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When we next shift from production to consumption, residential and commer347
cial natural gas usage is regulated at the state or local level. Here, programs vary
and remain in flux. Some local communities have or are considering precluding
348
natural gas from new construction,
while others encourage energy efficient
349
buildings and homes. Furthermore, states are unveiling an array of different
350
climate programs, ranging from renewable portfolio standards to aggressive
campaigns to reduce GHG emissions from within their borders. Just a few examples: California’s goal is to reach 100% of its electricity from clean energy by 2045;
351
Hawaii too hopes to reach 100% clean energy by 2045; and New Jersey expects
352
to reduce its emissions 80% below 2006 levels by 2050. Even the “poor but fos353
sil-fuel rich state” of New Mexico has targeted a carbon-free grid by 2045. Nevada will require that utilities obtain half their generation from renewable resources, and the state has a goal of having all the state’s electric generation carbon354
free by 2050. Oregon too may opt for reducing its emissions by 80% below 1990
347. See generally State and Local Policy Database, AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGYEFFICIENT ECONOMY, https://database.aceee.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).
348. After Berkeley, California “banned the use of natural gas in most new buildings,” other California cities considered following suit, along with other cities, such as Philadelphia. Andrew Maykuth,
One City Just Banned New Natural Gas Hookups to Save the Planet: Could Philly Follow Suit?, PHILA.
INQUIRER, July 19, 2019. San Jose next banned new residential hook-ups. See Haley Weiss & Anne C.
Mulkern, San Jose Approves Proposal Banning Residential Natural Gas, E&E NEWS (Sept. 18, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2019/09/18/stories/1061135071. Conversely, Arizona opted to prevent local cities from adopting bans on new natural gas hookups. Carlos Anchondo, State Preempts Local
Bans on Natural Gas Hookups, E&E NEWS (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/
energywire/stories/1062439547.
349. See State Policy Program, AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECONOMY,
https://aceee.org/sector/state-policy (last visited Mar. 3, 2020). New technologies, such as advanced
metering infrastructure, might promote greater efficiency in natural gas usage at the residential and
commercial level. See ROMANY WEBB, DEPLOYING ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE ON
THE NATURAL GAS SYSTEM: REGULATORY CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (2018).
350. See U.S. State Electricity Portfolio Standards, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS
(Nov.
2019),
https://www.c2es.org/document/renewable-and-alternate-energy-portfoliostandards/. “As of the end of 2018, 29 states and the District of Columbia had [RPSs].” Updated Renewable Portfolio Standards Will Lead to More Renewable Electricity Generation, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=38492.
351.

H.R. 623, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2015).

352. Climate Change, N.J DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., https://www.nj.gov/dep/climatechange/ (last
visited Feb. 24, 2020).
353. Nathan Rott, In Midst of An Oil Boom, New Mexico Sets Bold New Climate Goals, NPR (Mar.
13, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/13/702877664/in-midst-of-an-oil-boom-new-mexico-sets-boldnew-climate-goals.
354. S. 358, 2019 Leg. 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019); Catherine Morehouse, Nevada Passes Bill for 50%
Renewables by 2030, 100% Carbon Free by 2050, NCEL (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.ncel.net/
2019/04/22/nevada-passes-bill-for-50-renewables-by-2030-100-carbon-free-by-2050/. The City of Las
Vegas became committed to only renewable energy for government buildings and infrastructure in
2016. C. Moon Reed, Climate Change in Nevada Can Be Stopped With Our Help, L.V. SUN (Mar. 1, 2019),
https://lasvegassun.com/news/2019/mar/01/climate-change-in-nevada-can-be-stopped-with-our-h/.
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355

levels by 2050. New York, which openly opposes some new pipeline construc356
tion, targets having 70% of its electricity generated from renewables by 2030,
357
and slashing emissions considerably by 2050. A few years earlier, New York even
developed a Methane Reduction Plan, proposing to slash methane emissions con358
siderably by 2050 (80% from 1990 levels). Meanwhile, though, other states are
359
considering barriers to renewable generation.
Private sector initiatives further compound planning, as both industry and
360
consumers are altering markets for natural gas. Increasingly, large industrial
355. Cassandra Profita, Contentious Oregon Climate Plan Takes Lessons From Californa’s Mistakes,
NPR (Jun. 6, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/06/729594169/contentious-oregon-climate-plantakes-lessons-from-californias-mistakes. Portland has been involved in climate actions since 1993, and is
currently working to reduce its emission by 80% from 1990 levels by 2050. CITY OF PORTLAND AND
MULTNOMAH CTY. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN SUMMARY, 9, 15 (2015). Oregon’s Governor also talks
about decarbonizing the state’s natural gas grid with renewable natural gas. KATE BROWN & KRISTEN
SHEERAN, OREGON CLIMATE AGENDA: A STRONG, INNOVATIVE, INCLUSIVE ECONOMY WHILE
ACHIEVING STATE CLIMATE EMISSIONS GOALS 10 (2018).
356. See Sam Mintz & Peter Behr, Top Staffer Plunges FERC Into Trump’s Coal, Nuclear Fight,
E&E NEWS (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060093711 (discussing criticism by now
former FERC staffer of Governor Cuomo’s efforts to block a pipeline).
357. Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act, 2019 N.Y. Laws ch. 106 (statewide
GHG emissions are to be reduced by 60% from 1990 levels by 2030, and then to 15% of 1990 levels by
2050). According to a legislator’s press release, the bill will “require 70 percent of the electric generation
secured by load serving entities regulated by the Public Service Commission to be produced by renewable energy systems by 2030. Additionally, the bill requires that the statewide electrical demand system
will be zero emissions by 2040. The measure would spur the procurement of at least nine gigawatts of
offshore wind electric generation by 2035, six gigawatts of distributed photovoltaic solar generation by
2025, three gigawatts of statewide energy storage capacity by 2030 and 185 trillion BTUs of end use
energy savings below the 2025 energy use forecast.” News Release, Assembly Passes Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act, (June 20, 2019) (on file at https://nyassembly.gov/
Press/files/20190620.php); see generally Michael B. Gerrard & Edward McTiernan, New Climate Law
Will Reshape NY’s Key Sectors, 8 N.Y.L.J. 262 (2019). Also in June 2019, the New York City Council
declared a climate emergency. City Council Res. 864 (N.Y.C. 2019).
358. Maxine Joselow, N.Y.’s Cuomo Announces Emissions-Reduction Plan, E&E NEWS (May 18,
2017), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2017/05/18/stories/1060054720. The plan identifies 25 actions, including “formalizing and standardizing the process of reviewing new transmission infrastructure
projects, deploying methane detection systems in residential areas, and prioritizing the repair of pipeline leaks.” Id. Other states, such as California, Colorado, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming have taken varying steps toward reducing emissions as well. Id.; see also Mike Lee, Pa. Finalizes Emissions Plan for
New Gas Wells, E&E NEWS (June 8, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060083865
(describing program, including the use of Best Available Technology for reducing leaks).
359. See, e.g., Jefferey Tomich, Strangled Ohio Wind Industry: ‘We Don’t Want to Give Up’, E&E
NEWS (July 12, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060727747.
360. See Beyond Politics: The Private Governance Response to Climate Change, 48 ENVTL. L. REP.
NEWS & ANALYSIS 11049 (2018) (discussing MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M.
GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS: THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2017)); Maria L. Banda, The Bottom-Up Alternative: The Mitigation Potential of
Private Climate Governance, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 325 (2018); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Keynote:
Motivating Private Climate Governance: The Role of the Efficiency Gap, 71 ARK. L. REV. 349 (2018); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Daniel J. Metzger, Symposium on Corporate Sustainability in the Era of Shifting
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purchasers are demanding renewably generated electric power. Concurrent with
President Trump’s early efforts to boost fossil fuels, large industrial customers
362
conversely were exploring direct purchases of renewable energy. Utilities are
363
beginning to propose zero-carbon plans and phaseouts of natural gas. In the
transportation sector, the movement toward electric vehicles continues, and current
policies are unlikely to hinder planning by the world’s automobile manufactur364
ers.
This all renders the task of planning fluid and complex, but it does not justify
abandoning it altogether. FERC should engage in planning and a broader assessment of market need, rather than abjectly accepting even dubious precedent
agreements. Critically examining need will allow greater consumer engagement by
having consumers acknowledge the stranded asset problem and affording them a
choice during project inception. State utility commissions could adopt programs
enabling consumers who ultimately pay the rates for the natural gas to examine the
potential stranded asset problem, and consider accepting the imposition of some
365
cost-adder to ensure the infrastructure remains justified in the long run. National Grid, which serves over 3 million customers in the Northeast and hopes to reduce its carbon emissions by 80% by 2050, recently illustrated how this could be
366
done. In July 2019, the utility sent notices to some customers urging their support for a 23.5-mile Northeast Enhancement Supply Project that would provide
Federal Policies: Private Governance Responses to Climate Change: The Case of Global Civil Aviation, 30
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 62 (2018).
361. E.g., Robert Walton, Target Aims for 100% Renewables by 2030; Walmart Announces Minnesota
Solar Deal, UTILITY DIVE (June 14, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/target-aims-for-100renewables-by-2030-walmart-announces-minnesota-solar/556897/. Walmart’s goal is to power its operations with 50% renewables by 2025. Emily Holbrook, Walmart Enters into 46 Power Purchase Agreements
to Supply Power to Stores in 5 States, ENVTL. LEADER (May 14, 2019),
https://www.environmentalleader.com/2019/05/walmart-enters-into-46-power-purchase-agreements-tosupply-power-to-stores-in-5-states/.
362. E.g., Jeffrey Tomich, Corporate America Leads Clean Energy Push in Coal-Reliant Mo., E&E
NEWS (May 12, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2017/05/12/stories/1060054458 (noting
Walmart’s efforts).
363. General Electric recently announced it would close a natural gas facility years early, replacing it with renewable generation. David Ferris, GE Shutters Gas Plant Decades Early As Renewables Surge,
E&E NEWS (June 25, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060652109. Portland General announced
a goal of 80% reduction by 2050. Paul Shukovsky, Oregon’s Largest Electric Utility Seeks Decarbonized Future, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (July 24, 2019), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-andenergy/oregons-largest-electric-utility-seeks-decarbonized-future. New Jersey’s Public Service Enterprise Group, Inc. announced it would seek zero-carbon by 2050. Edward Klump, N.J. Power Company
Targets ‘Net Zero” Carbon by 2050, E&E NEWS (July 26, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/
energywire/stories/1060789619.
364.

See NORDHAUS & KALEN, supra note 29, at 210-12.

365.

See generally MICHAEL B. GERRARD & JOHN C. DERNBACH, LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP
DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 24 (2018).
366. See Rod Kuckro, National Grid Plans to Cut Carbon by 80% by 2050, E&E NEWS (June 18,
2018), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2018/06/18/stories/1060084833.
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367

gas to New Yorkers. Project opponents argue that this “massive 1 billion-dollar
project is based on fundamentally flawed, unsupported arguments about increasing
368
demand for pipeline gas in National Grid’s service area.” As New Yorkers brace
for the move to a carbon net-zero future by 2050, National Grid could instead directly address both present and future market need and commit to a program for
decommissioning or, at least, ensuring that it will become carbon neutral by 2050
and that customers will not shoulder any costs of decommissioning the infrastruc369
ture or necessary new technological enhancements that could have been avoided.
Of course, another option might be just accepting that our insurance and bankruptcy laws will address adverse consequences of stranded assets—a dubious assumption as the nation witnesses how coal mining bankruptcies are disrupting local
370
communities and employees. Alternatively, the government could intervene
371
with funding.
While this article does not purport to offer the ideal path forward, three observations seem undeniable. To begin with, we must not let the oddity of jurisdictional boundaries presented by overlapping governmental institutions impair our
ability to reach deep decarbonization by 2050. That means, second, that expanding
our natural gas system infrastructure cannot proceed blindly without any meaningful assessment of present and future need. Finally, any assessment of need must
address (a) how we can limit additional infrastructure and avoid a stranded asset

367. Utilities Asking New York Customers to Back a Gas Pipeline, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (July 10,
2019),
https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/utilities-asking-new-yorkcustomers-to-back-a-gas-pipeline?context=search&index=3.
368. 350, FALSE DEMAND: THE CASE AGAINST THE WILLIAMS FRACKED GAS PIPELINE 2
(2019). National Grid was subsequently ordered to deliver gas to New York customers. See Bernadette
Hogan, National Grid to Deliver Natural Gas After Cuomo Order, N.Y. POST (Oct. 11, 2019),
https://nypost.com/2019/10/11/national-grid-pledges-to-deliver-natural-gas-after-cuomo-order/; David
Iaconangelo, Utility Warns of Gas Shortages in Cuomo Pipeline Fight, E&E NEWS (Feb. 26, 2020),
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2020/02/26/stories/1062449229.
369. Christopher Serkin and Michael Vandenbergh proffer what they call prospective grandfathering, establishing up front an amortization period for decommissioning a fossil fuel asset. Christopher Serkin & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Prospective Grandfathering: Anticipating the Energy Transition
Problem, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1019, 1023-24 (2018).
370. Wyoming had to respond when a Wyoming coal mine closed precipitously. Andrew Grahm,
Bankruptcy, Coal Experts Voice Concerns, Takeaways, WYOFILE, Oct. 29, 2019; Andrew Graham, New
Wyoming Coal Company Abandons Mines and Miners, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, July 8, 2019; see also
NACE, PLANT, & BROWNING supra note 16, at 10; see generally Joshua Macey & Jackson Salovaara,
Bankruptcy as Bailout: Coal Company Insolvency and the Erosion of Federal Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 879
(2019).
371. Adam Aton, Inslee Wants Fed to Buy, Decommission Fossil Fuel Assets, E&E NEWS (June 25,
2019), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060652141/feed (former Presidential candidate
Governor Inslee discussing possible government-funded program). State governments could pass securitization bond legislation lowering consumer costs for retiring stranded assets. See, e.g., Herman K.
Trabish, Securitization Fever: Renewables Advocates Seize Wall Street’s Innovative Way to End Coal,
UTILITY DIVE (May 28, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/securitization-fever-renewablesadvocates-seize-wall-streets-innovative-w/555089/.
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that possibly incentivizes keeping that asset operational longer than necessary, or
(b) how we can deploy quickly enough technological tools for allowing natural gas
in both the power sector and residential/industrial sectors to become carbon neutral by no later than 2050.

V. CONCLUSION
The disparate battles against pipelines converge to form a mosaic portraying
the evolving war against pipelines. Unfortunately, it is war being waged on the
wrong turf. For far too long, our energy policy has been marred by such internecine skirmishes. Opponents look for weaknesses: whether a particular pipeline can
be impeded by the ESA or the CWA; whether a limitation can be found in federal
eminent domain authority; or whether a project can be challenged for lacking a sufficiently robust environmental analysis under NEPA or the NGA. Meanwhile,
proponents tout the benefits of natural gas and its accompanying infrastructure,
such as its abundance, low cost, and reduced GHGs compared to coal. But rarely
do we examine that infrastructure itself—natural gas pipelines and their longevity.
To be sure, the necessity of examining that infrastructure is nothing new. Over sixty years ago, one observer lamented that “little attention has been accorded to the
372
thought that we may be overexpanding pipeline capacity.” The fear then was
that additional infrastructure would incent depleting natural gas reserves that had
373
to be conserved, while today the fear is more ominous—an incentive to rely on a
GHG emitting fossil fuel, or saddle our economy with billions in stranded investments. Reliance on natural gas in the southeastern United States, for example, may
374
hinder that region’s ability to reach a zero-carbon emission goal by 2050.
Historical energy transitions generally occur during periods when statecreated or sanctioned institutional mechanisms surface to address emergent and
feasible technologies, market shifts, changes in resource availability, or adverse ex375
ternalities—smog, acid rain, mercury emissions, or GHGs. Each time we take
such a targeted step, we affect more than the target itself—creating a feedback loop
376
that adds complexity to the energy transition. Shortages of interstate natural gas
377
contribute to touting the benefits of the nation’s abundant coal resources. Reducing sulfur emissions from eastern coal precipitates either fuel switching or de-

372. Jerome J. McGrath, Federal Regulation of Producers in Relation to Conservation of Natural Gas,
44 GEO. L.J. 676, 676-77 (1956).
373.

Id. at 677.

374. See Kristi E. Swartz, Gas-Heavy Southeast Falling Short on Carbon Goals-Report, E&E NEWS
(Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/08/02/stories/1060826263.
375. See supra Section II.A for a discussion of energy transitions over the past century and the
federal legislation and financial incentives that pushed those transitions forward.
376.

See generally NORDHAUS & KALEN, supra note 29 (passim).

377.

Id. at 142.
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veloping western (and other) low sulfur coal resources. Replacing retiring coalfired electric power capacity with renewable resources may require additional
transmission lines, while replacing the lost coal-fired electric generation with natural gas may prompt more pipeline construction.
Today, however, our energy transition is sui generis. To begin with, the urgency of reducing or eliminating our carbon economy—or at least our carbon-emitting
economy—is pushing states and local communities to act swiftly while Congress
and federal agencies act slowly. Whether as subsidies for non-fossil generation, renewable portfolio standards, new climate programs, or other indirect mechanisms
for affecting generation resources, states and local communities are changing the
face of the national energy grid—both for natural gas and electric transmission.
Next, technological advancements are moving faster than regulatory bodies can respond. As this unfolds, our grid will need to expand to accommodate increased capacity from the transportation sector. That may mean ensuring that CO2 emissions
from oil (gasoline) are not shifted from the transportation sector to a natural-gas
dependent electric power sector. Battery technology and small modular nuclear reactors are progressing apace as well, all likely to influence dramatically the electric
grid of the future—a grid that many hope will be more distributed, with locally
generated carbon-free resources. Increased energy efficiency, coupled with declining costs for both wind and solar power, as well as enhancements and potential reduced costs for battery technology, all render the future energy economy fluid.
Unpredictable. Added to technological advancements are how institutions and our
legal system may hinder advancements, perhaps best illustrated by the present
379
fight over the Commission’s approach toward energy storage. Too many variables, therefore, make this energy transition more difficult than those experienced
in the past. Our goal is simply a clean energy economy with many technological
innovations, market developments, and institutional paths for getting there.
And our problem is that infrastructure, such as natural gas pipelines, attends
each of those paths. We nevertheless continue to make decisions without sufficient
acknowledgment and inquiry into whether that infrastructure will remain economically and environmental sound and viable for a sufficiently long period, without
compromising our flexibility for moving toward a green economy and adjusting
380
with technological, cultural, market, and institutional changes. FERC’s policy
378.

See id. at 157, 159.

379. See supra Section II.C for a discussion of the Trump Administration’s efforts to lock in legal
rules promoting legacy fossil fuels at the expense of more advanced energy technologies.
380. A 2012 report warned the shale revolution might further retard necessary technological advancements in carbon capture. Henry D. Jacoby, Francis M. O’Sullivan & Sergey Paltsev, The Influence
of Shale Gas on U.S. Energy and Environmental Policy, 1 ECON. ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y 27, 50 (2012)
(“Under more stringent GHG targets these technologies are needed, but the shale gas delays their market role by up to two decades. Thus in the shale boom there is the risk of stunting these programs altogether. While taking advantage of this gift in the short run, treating gas a ‘bridge’ to a low-carbon future, it is crucial not to allow the greater ease of the near-term task to erode efforts to prepare a landing
at the other end of the bridge.”).
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toward natural gas pipelines exemplifies this abject willingness to proceed blindly
into the future. It decries the utility of examining macro-level questions, captured
instead by the ease and allure of examining individual pipeline decisions with hardly any inquiry into present let alone future need. Our environment and economy
demand otherwise.

